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ACCOUNT RENDER. See Assuzirsir, 9.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.
I. Taking an acknowledgment of a deed is a quasi judicial act, and cannot,
be performed by a party interested. Humpton v. Stevens, 107.
2. A trustee in a mortgage or deed of trust to hold in pledge, with power
of sale, &c., is so far a party in interest that he is not competent to take the
acknowledgment of the deed. .Id.
3. The want of proper acknowledgmeut does not affect the validity of the
deed, but prevents it from being legally recorded. id.
4. If a deed shows upon its face that it was not legally acknowledged (as:
where the acknowledgment was taken by a party), it is not entitled to be
recorded, and though it is in fact entered on the records, it is not constructive
notice to subsequent purchasers ; but if the acknowledgment is regular on its
face, then it is properly recorded, and its record operates as notice, notwith-
standing there may be some hidden defect. Id.
5. But even with a patent defect in the acknowledgment, and therefore
without legal record, a subic j.ent purchaser with notice in fact will take
subject to the deed. Id.
6. A deed acknowledged by the husband is entitled to record notwith-
standing defective acknowledgment by the wife. Rayner v. Lee, 601.
ACTION. See BETTIX; DAMAOES, 6; IIIGnwAY, 4; INFANT, 4; RAILROAD,
16; REAL ESTATE.
1. An action of tort will lie for property wrongfully converted by a mort-,
gagor in a chattel mortgage. Matter of Hicks, 476.
2. Where an injury is the combined result of a defect in a highway and
an accident which occurred without the fault of the plaintiff though it deprived
him at the time of the injury of the power of exercising the usual care and
prudence of a traveller, the plaintiff is not in pari delicto and may recover
from the town. 1landersclded v. Dubuque, 526.
3. Plaintiff averred that he was driving a sleigh and his horse becoming
frightened and unmanageable without his fault, ran away, threw plaintiff out
of the sleigh, and stepping into a hole in the highway, broke his leg. Held,
that a good cause of action was set forth. Id.
4. An action will lie by a party holding property as security, to recover
damages for fire from a locomotive, under R. S. a. 51, 31 of Maine. Bean
v. Atlantic and St. L. R. R., 531.
5. And insurers of the property may recover the whole amount of injury
in the name of the plaintiff, who assigned to them. Id.
6. The licensee of land is liable in an action to the licensor for injuries
resulting to cattle from his negligence. Eaton v. Winnie, 540.
7. An action of deceit will not lie for breach of a promise to execute a
bond to reconvey real estate, where the promissor induced the plaintiff to
convey to him, in consideration of a loan and such promise- Long v.
lWoodinan, 601.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1807, March 3. See EJECTMENT, I.
1862, June 7. See TAXATIOzT, 7.
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1862, July 17. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 19, 21.
1863, March 12. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 4.
1865, March 3. See TAXATION, 7.
1865, March 2. See CONSTITUTIONAL Liw, 7.
1866, July 13. See STAxi-, 2.
1868, - . See ATTORNEY, 4.
1870, May 31. See ELzcTioN, 2.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMIRALTY.
1. A service of a libel in a proceeding in personam on a maritime contract,
against a citizen of another district by attachment of his property, is a good
service and the court obtains jurisdiction. Manchester v. Hotchciss, 379.
2. A defendant does not waive his right to object to the jurisdiction of the
court in an admiralty proceeding by filing a stiPulation for costs and to abide
the decree of the court, &c., under Rule 4 in Admiralty. Id.
3. Service- of a libel in personam in a maritime cause, in the admiralty
court of one district, upon a citizen of another district by attachment of his
property, is not a good service and confers no jurisdiction. Insurance Co. v.
D. and C. Steam Navigation Co., 383.
4. In a proceeding in personam on a maritime contract, in a court of admi-
ralty of one district against a citizen of another district, service by attach-
ment of his property is not sufficient, and confers no jurisdiction. Atkins v.
fibre Co., 389.
5. For the purposes of such a question a corporation is to be held a citizen
of the state in which it is incorporated. Id.
6. An entry on the record that "Mr. B. appears for respondent and has a
week to perfect an appearance and answer," does not show such an appear-
ance as amounts to a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction. Id.
AGENT. See ASSUMPsIT, 3; BANKRUPTYO, 16.
1. When factors have made large advances or incurred expense on account
of the consignment, the consignor cannot by subsequent orders control their
right to sell at such a time, as in the exercise of a sound discretion they may
deem best to secure indemnity to themselves and promote the interests of the
consignor. Field v. Farrington, 61.
2. The managing agent of a steamboat employed to secure freights, cannot
speculate on such freights for his own advantage. Rea et al. v. Copelin, 61.
3. The statements of an agent are admissible to charge the principal, only
when they are part of the res gestce. Whiteside v. Margard, 122.
4. Agency cannot be proved by the statement of the agent alone. Id.
5. It is a well settled rule of equity, that all gifts, contracts, or benefits
from a principal to an agent are constructively fraudulent and void. Com-
stock v. Comstock, 123.
6. Agents are not permitted to deal with their principal except upon show-
ing the most entire good faith. .d.
7. Where an agent receives certain shares of stock, "to do the best he
can with it, and have one-half the proceeds," he has no interest in the stock
until it is sold, and must account with his principal for the whole amount
and the dividends received on it. Wight v. Wood, 124.
8. Ordinarily, an agent contracting in behalf of the government, or of the
public, is not personally bound by the contract. Perrin v. Lyman's Adm'rx,
188.
9. A quartermaster in the army of the United States during the late rebel-
lion employed a person as a clerk, put his name on the government pay-rolls,
with the names of the other clerks of his department, and paid him $75
monthly out of the funds of the United States, said clerk signing the usual
vouchers. He worked for the government, and performed no service what-
ever for the quartermaster individually. Hedld, that the quartermaster was
not personally liable to such clerk. Id.
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10. The declarations of an agent not made in the course of his agency are
not binding on his principal. Bennett v. Holmes, 193.
11. An agent attending a sale for his principal has no right to buy for
himself or any one else at a less price than would secure his principal's
claim. Walker v. Hill, 276.
12. A del credere agent is primarily liable to satisfy his principal the price
of goods sold. Lewis v. Brehrne, 469.
13. An agent will not be personally liable on a written contract signed as
agent. AlcClernan v. Hall, 531.
14. Where the defendant's agent wrote to plaintiffs (a bank), that he had
deposited certain moneys to plaintiffs' credit, who thereupon credited the
defendants, they will not be bound, if it appears the agent only deposited his
check which turned out worthless. Savings Inst. v. Allentown Bank, 532.
15. A check is not money. Id.
16. The defendants were responsible for the acts of their agent, as if they
had deposited a worthless check. Id.
.17. Refusal by an agent to perform a contract, is the refusal of his
employer, and occasions a breach of contract on the part of the principal.
Keeney v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 662.
AGREEMENT.
1. An agreement to send plaintiffs all the iron lying at a certain place, is
not a warranty, and if the iron is not there an omission to send is no breach.
Robinson v. Flint, 342.
2. The term "secures the payment of the purchase-money" in an agree-
ment for the sale of real estate, does not signify payment in money, but
implies a term of credit. Foot v. Webb, 470.
3. An agreement to sell real estate, that fails to fix the term of credit or
the security for the purchase-money is void for uncertainty. Foot v. Webb, 471.
AMENDMENT. See PLEADING, 5 ; PRACTICE, 14.
1. A court which has jurisdiction of the parties, may amend the ad damnum
so as to bring it within the jurisdiction as to amount. ferrill v. Curtis, 124.
2. The court will amend or conform a complaint to the facts duly proved,
after judgment. Fullerton v. Dalton, 343.
3. Correcting a mistake in the name of a party by amending, is no ground
for reversal. Dewy v. McLain, 471.
ARBITRATION.
1. A court of equity has jurisdiction over awards, but will not exercise it
in case of awards which by agreement are made rules of court. Ivest Jersey
R. Co. v. Thomas, 343.
2. No court will review and correct an award. Id.
3. If the arbitrators proceed without the knowledge of either party, or
decide without any evidence, it is such misconduct as will set aside the award.
rd.
4. The giving of a note for the amount of an award is a waiver of irregu-
larities in the proceedings. Miller v. Brumbaugh, 403.
6. An award of arbitrators as soon as filed has the form and substance of
a judgment and continues so until reversed. Wilkinson's Appeal, 538.
ASSIGNMENT. See CnAuPERTY.; MORTGAGE, 24.
1. An absolute transfer of stock, and a written memorandum of the trans-
action of the same date, are to be construed together. Parks v. Comstock,
471.
2. One seal will suffice for both. Id.
ASSUMPSIT. See INFANT, 5; JOINT LABILrITY, 1 ; OFFICE AND OPFICER, 3.
1. The relation between a son-in-law and his father-in-law, rebuts the
presumption of an implied promise of the father-in-law to pay for board.
Daubenspeck, Executor v. Powers, 62.
2. An action for money paid, will lie to recover money paid for an object
never accomplished, and which has become impossible to accomplish. Church-
hill v. Stone, 342.
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3. An action to recover money paid for the sale of an agency, will lie,
where there was fraud in the party selling, he having no right tb make
such sale. Baker Y. Spencer, 347.
4. Where the defendant has received goods wrongfully, the owner may
waive the tort and recover for goods sold and delivered. Deysher v. Triebel,
402.
5. Assumpsit for money had and received lies where one tortiously in pos-
session of another's goods converts them into money. .d.
6. The count for money had and received is governed by equitable princi-
ples and only lies where the defendant ex mquo et bono ought to refund. Id.
7. Where there has been no fraud or deceit and the defendant may with a
good conscience retain the money he cannot be compelled to repay on a count
for money had.and received. Id.
8. Will lie for a balance struck between partners. Knerr v. Hoffman, 541.
9. Account render is the remedy if no balance is struck. Id.
10. If the parties to an illegal contract arc not in pari delicto, the one taken
advantage of, may recover money paid, in an action for money had and re-
ceived. Inhabitants of Concord v. Delaney, 664.
ATTACHMENT. See ADMIRALTY, 1, 3; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 18, 19;
JUDGMENT, 1; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4.
1. Proceedings in attachment partake of the character, both of suits in
rem and in personam. Cooper v. Reynolds, 62.
2. The law regards the attachment of a mortgage debt, as an assignment
of the mortgage, so as to enable the attaching party to maintain a scire facias
in his own name. Rushton v. Rowe, 344.
3. Interest will not cease after the service of the attachment, where the
delay is occasioned by the unreasonable conduct of the garnishee. Id.
4. Garnishee may avoid liability for interest by pnying money into court.
Id.
5. The defendant in foreign attachment in account render is not a party
in a scire facias against the garnishee, nor non-resident partner in attachment
execution. Knerr v. Hoffman, 541.
6. A balance struck between partners may be attached. Id.
ATTORNEY. See IMITATIONS, 15 ; PARTNERSIIIP, 13.
1. An attorney, employed or consulted as such, to draw a deed or an ap-
plication for an original title to laud, is in the line of his profession, and is
precluded from buying in, for his own use, any outstanding title. Smith v.
Brotherline, 50.
2. The relation between him and his client is confidential, and whether he
acts upon information derived from him, or from any other source, he is
affected with a trust. Id.
3. But where an attorney was consulted and drew an application for certain
land on which the client's improvements were supposedto be, and it appeared
afterwards by a more accurate survey that the improvements were on a dif-
ferent tract, the subsequent purchase of the latter tract by the attorney in
ignorance of the fact that his client's improvements were on it, will not be
held to be in trust. Id.
4. The Act of 1868, c. 2. s. 5, requiring the courts to administer the abjura-
tion of the Ku-Klux to "all officers," did not apply to attorneys. Ingersoll
v. Howard, 193.
5. Attorneys, solicitors, and counsel have a lien upon property recovered
by their services. Hunt v. McClanahan, 193.6. While the suit is pending, the client cannot dispose of the subject-
matter irr-suit. Id.
7. An attorney or solictor, who is also counsel in a cause, has a lien on
moneys collected therein for his" fees and disbursements in the cause, and in
any suit or proceeding brought to recover other moneys covered by the same
retainer.. State of Texas v. White, 232.
8. If the attorney is guilty of no bad faith or improper conduct, and ciaims
to have a fair set-off against his client, which the latter refuses to allow, a
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motion to pay into court the moneys collected will not be granted, but the
parties will be left to their action. State of Texas v. White, 232.
9. A party has a general right to change his attorney, and a rule for that
purpose will be granted, leaving to the attorney the advantage of any lien he
may have on papers or moneys in his hands as security for his fees and dis-
bursements. Id.
10. An attorney acknowledging service on tile back of a summons is pre-
sumed to have authority. Hendrix v. Fuller, 403.
11. TuE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA, 753.
AUCTION.
Tile Mdqlest bidder is one who makes the highest bid in good faith. Gray v.
Viers, 471.
BAILMENT.
A bank is only bound to take ordinary care of bonds deposited as collateral
security for a note discounted. Jenkins v. Bank of Bowdoinhani, 598.
BANK AND BANKER. See BAILMENT; CONFEDERATE STATES, 25 ; PAY-
MENT, 2 ; TROVEn, 3.
1. Where C. who was cashier of a bank and also town treasurer, embez-
zled the funds of the bank by means of loans, on notes made as such treas-
urer, in a suit by the bank on such notes, it was Held:
(1). That the votes of the town and the reports of the town treasurers were
admissible in evidence upon the question of the authority of C. to borrow
money for the town.
(2). (By a majority of the court). That as C. was engaged in an extensive
fraud upon the bank, and in view of all the facts, it was fairly presumable
that lie made the note in the form in which he did as a false representation
and cover by which to perpetrate a fraud on the bank, and with no intention
to hind the town.
(3). But that, if he intended to bind the town, fiis own fraud as treasurer
was known to him as agent of the bank, and was therefore the knowledge of
the bank, and that the plaintiffs therefore could not recover. First National
Bank v. Vew Milford, 572.
2. Deposits made with a private banker are not due until demand is made.
Fort v. McCully, 598.
3. If a banker transfers a depositor's notes before demand made of the
deposit, the latter cannot set off the deposit against the holder. Id.
4. Any language whether verbal or written, used by a bank office repre-
senting a check drawn upon the bank as good, estops the bank from afterwards
denying that there are funds to pay the same. Pope v. Bank of Albion, 599.
5. A bank collecting drafts deposited in another bank, as its agent, cannot
hold the proceeds against the depositor of the drafts, for a debt of the bank,
in the absence of evidence to show that a specific loan was made on the faith
of the drafts. Dod v. Fourth National Bank New York, 599.
6. A transfer of stock in a banking corporation, organized under the Act
of June 3d 1864, to a bond .fide holder, is valid though the seller or pledgor
be at the time indebted to the bank, and a by-law of the bank declared that
no transfer of the stock by any shareholder indebted to the bank should be
made without the consent of the board of directors. Such a by-law in effect
attempti to create a lien upon stock for debts of the holder, and the result is
the same as if a loan were made upon the security of the stock-a transaction
lbrbidden by the 35th section of the Act. Eransville Bank v. Metropolitan
Bank, 774.
7. A certificate of deposit payable to the order of depositor on the return
of the certificate was issued by Bank A. to T. D., who could not write. The
bank took his mark on its signature book, and wrote a description of him
opposite. Shortly afterwards the certificate was stolen from T. D. and
presented to Bank B. by a stranger who gave his name as T. D. and said he
could not write. Thereupon the cashier of Bank B. endorsed the certificate
to his own order with the name of T. D. to which tle stranger made his
mark, and an employee of Bank B. added his signature as "witness to mark."
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The cashier then endorsed the certificate and sent it through a correspondent
to Bank A., which thereupon paid it, and the money was handed over to the
stranger. Thereafter the real T. D. appeared at Bank A., and on discovery
of the forgery Bank A. paid him the amount and brought suit gainst Bank
B. to recover the payment on the forged endorsement. Held, that Bank A.
had a right to rely on the identification of T. D. by Bank B. and could
recover. State Bank v. Savings Co., 786.
BANKRUPTCY. See TimE, 2.
I. Jurisdiction.
1. A proceeding in bankruptcy from the filing of the petition to the dis-
charge or refusal to discharge the bankrupt is a single case, and is subject to
appeal or writ of error as such, but there may be a large number of cases or
questions arising in the course of it, and these may be the subject of review
by the Circuit Court hy writ of error or appeal or petition to review, according
to their nature. Citizens' Bank v. Ober, 36.
2. If the miatter is a suit at law or in equity, or a dispute by the assignee
of a creditor's claim allowed, or a claim by a creditor wholly or in part
rejected, then it must be brought before the Circuit Court by writ of error or
appeal. .d.
3. But all other cases or questions arising in the progress of a case in
bankruptcy fall within the supervisory jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and
must be brought before it by bill or petition to review. Id.
4. The settlement of the status of a creditor's claim as to priority with
respect to other liens is not the allowance or rejection of the claim meant by
sect. 8, by which an appeal is given, and the proper mode of bringing such
a matter before the Circuit Court is by petition to review. Id.
5. An assignee made a sale of real estate of the bankrupt at which certain
creditors purchased. The District Court confirmed the sale against the ex-
ceptions of other creditors, and made an order as to the priority of certain
liens. Held, that this was a proceeding within the supervisory power of the
Circuit Court, and should be brought before it by petition to review. Id.
TI. Acts of Bankruptcy.
6. The 35th and 39th sections of the Bankrupt Act are not in conflict with
respect to this question. The latter section enumerates the various acts which
subject a person to involuntary bankruptcy, and that is the main purpose of
the section, and the fact that a preference, given by a debtor to a creditor
within six months next before the filing of the petition against him in con-
travention of the terms of this section, is denounced as an act of bankruptcy ;
and that the money so paid may be recovered back by the assignee, is not
inconsistent with the limitation of the right in the 35th section to ca!e.s
occurring within six and four months of the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings. Bean v. Brookinire, 181.
7. The 35th and 39th sections having set up a rule at variance with the
common law and with the statutes of most of the states, by which certain
payments and transfers of property are declared void, very properly limit
and define the circumstances within which this new rule should operate. d.
III. Effect of Proceedings.
8. An assignment in bankruptcy takes effect as if made at the commence-
ment of the proceedings. Mays v. M'anufacturers' Bank, 344.
9. The assignment transfers only the property which the bankrupt owned
at the filing of the petition. Id.
10. The whole world is bound to take notice of the assignment by operation
of law. id.
11. It is the duty of a court of bankruptcy to see that the property to which
a bankrupt is entitled is secured to him, as much as to see that he surrenders
the balance to his creditors. Re Sterens, 523.
12. Personal property exempt by the laws of the state where the bankrupt
resides and where the petition is filed, will be protected wherever it may be
actually situated. d.
13. Personal property of a debtor residing in Wisconsin was attached in
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Illinois. Pending the attachment the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy in
Wisconsin. The property was exempt by the laws of Wisconsin. Reid:
(I). That the property was exempt under the Bankrupt Act and the attach-
ment dissolved.
(2). The Bankruptcy Court will not consider whether the property was
exempt under the laws of Illinois.
(3). The officer in possession of the property under the attachment writ
cannot retain the property until his fees arc paid. His only remedy is by
application to the court to be paid out of funds in the hands of the assignee.
Mays v. Manufacturers' Bank, 344.
IV. Practice.
14. That part of the 14th section of the Bankrupt Act which adopts the
state exemption laws in force in 1864 as the measure of property to be ex-
ezapted under proceedings in bankruptcy, is uniform in its operation among
the states, and is therefore constitutional. In re Beckerford, 57.
15. By the exemption laws of Missouri, in force in 1864, a homestead
may ,e set apart to a debtor out of a leasehold in real estate, or where such
leasehold is not susceptible of division he may retain $1000 out of the pro-
ceeds of it. Id.
V. Discharqe.
16. Debts due a principal by a factor for goods sold on commission are not
discharged by the discharge in bankruptcy. Lenke v. Booth, 743.
VI. Rights and Duties of Assignee.
17. Money paid by a debtor to his creditor more than four months before
tile commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy by or against such debtor,
cannot be recovered back from such creditor by the assignee of the bankrupt,
although the creditor knew that such payment was made to him by way of
preference, and that the debtor was insolvent at the time of making such
laymient and that the same was made in contemplation of insolvency or
bankruptcy. Bean v. Brookmire, 181.
18. The two clauses of the 35th section of the Bankrupt Law differ in this,
that the first clause is limited to a creditor or a person having a claim against
the bankrupt, or who is under liability for him, and who receives money or.
property by way of preference ; and the second clause applies to the purchase
of property of the bankrupt hy any person who has no claim against him and
is under no liability for bim. Id.
19. The word " payment" in the first part of the second clause of this
section is used either inadvertently or in a loose sense with respect to some
of the acts mentioned in this clause, but is intentionally omitted from the list
of transactions which are declared void under this clause of the section. Id.
20. A sale by an assignee under the Bankrupt Act, will not pass the real
estate to the vendee discharged of the dower of the bankrupt's wife. In re
Angier, 190.
21. The assignee in bankruptcy is not a judicial officer, his setting apart
exempt property is not conclusive. Fehlde v. Barr, 795.
22. The assignee's setting apart land as exempted, does not divest the lien
of judgment clear of exemption. 7d.
BETTING.
Either depositor of a bet on a race may maintain an action against the
stakeiholder for the deposit before the race. Cleveland v. 1o/f, 403.
BILL OF LA)ING.
])amage or deficiency in quantities specified, if any, to be deducted from
charges b consignees," in a bill of lading, is not a warranty of safe deli-
very. Price v. Jlartshorn, 796.
BILLS AND NOTES. See CONriDF1nATI, STATES, 17; ConronATION, 12;
MORTGAGE, 25 ; PARTNUcRSIHIP 9 ; P'LEADING, 2 ; IIECEI'T, 2.
1. A promissory note given for the purchase of slaveq, after the presi-
dent's proclamation of 1861, is void. C'arson v. .hrnter, 64.
2. Where a note is given in consideration of the sale of land to be con-
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veyed upon payment of the money, the payee cannot recover without tender
of a conveyance. Deitrich T. Franz, 64.
3. The secretary of a corporation is not liable on a promissory note signed
with his own name with 11 Sec'y." affixed, and bearing the seal of the corpo-
tion. Means v. Swormnstedt, 64.
4. In an action on a note since the Code, in New York, the defendant has
a right to prove that the plaintiff is not the real owner. Eaton v. Alger, 70.
• 5. A payee of a note will not be allowed to get rid of a defence of want
of consideration, by transferring a share of the obligation to another. Sax-
ton v. Dodge, 124.
6. Restoring a note to its original condition by erasing an alteration is
not a fraud on the endorser. Kountz v. Kennedy, 193.
7. There is no rnle of law independent of intention, by which an altera-
tion not affecting ultimate liability makes the instrument void. Id.
8. The transfer by one partner to another of the assets of the firm, is a
good consideration for a promissory note. Springer v. Thwyer, 344.
9. Wheri the endorsee produces the note on trial, it is to be presumed ie
is the holder in good faith, and that he received it before maturity. Id.
10. The law does not presume that the endorser is to be compensated in
the case of an accommodation endorsement. Perrine v. Hotchkiss, 345.
11. Under plea of want of consideration to a promissory note, the defend-
ant may offer testimony of any want of consideration, and plaintiff may
prove any. Miller v. Brumbaugh, 403.
12. The endorser of a note will not be liable even to a bond fide holder on
a forged endorsement unless he ratified or sanctioned it prior to the maturity
of the note. Woodruff v. Mtunroe, 403.
13. The payment after maturity of a note secured by mortgage, by the
owner of the mortgaged premises, extinguishes the note. Appledorn v.
Streeter, 403.
14. Possession of a note by one of two joint endorsees for four years after
its maturity, and until his death, is evidence of his ownership, and of his
right to appropriate it to the payment of a claim by maker against such en-
dorsees. Birkey v. 31c.fakin, 404.. 15. That the defendant was induced to purchase by false representations,
is a defence in bar of an action on a note for the purchase-money, though de-
fendant has not surrendered the article purchased. Groff v. ifansel, 408.
16. An offer to pay part in discharge of the whole, is not admissible in
a suit on a note against the maker. Id.
17. An endorsement will not create a liability where none was intended
to exist. Lewis v. Brehme, 470.
18. A promise by an endorser to pay a draft subsequent to its dishonor is
presumptive evidence that it had been presented in due time, and that he had
notice of its being dishonored. Id.
19. A note given for the sale of land, to which the Indian title is not ex-
tinguished, is void. Vickroy v. Pratt, 532.
20. Where no place of payment is named, a note is construed according
to the law of the place where it is made. Stickney v. Jordan, 532.
21. Compound interest is recoverable in Maine on a note payable there.
Id.
22. Interest cannot be claimed on prepayments of a note, payable on time,
without interest. Parker v. Moody, 532.
23. When the drawee of a bill of exchange refuses to pay at maturity,
notice of such refusal must be given to the drawer or he will be released.
Liggett v. W1eed, 600.
24. When the acceptance is conditional the drawee is not liable until con-
dition is fulfilled. Id.
25. The maker of a promissory note not governed by the law merchant,
may impeach the note for want of consideration in a suit by the assignee,
though the note is accompanied by a writing stating that it is all right.
,Tacqua v. Montgomery, 662.
26. Where a note with surety has been given upon an agreement that the
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payee shall deliver to the maker another note, and the payee fails to deliver,
the consideration for the note fails. lUeeg v. lWeigand. 750.
27. If such note is given as security for the surety on the old note, and he
pays the debt, lie may recover against the surety on the new note. Id.
28. A. held the promissory note of the defendant, obtained of him by
fraud, and which the defendant had demanded back immediately on discover-
ing the fraud. The note was payable to A.'s order and on time, and before
due A. endorsed it to the plaintiff in trust in part for certain creditors and
the balance for A.'s wife, the plaintiff having no knowledge of the infirmity
of the note. The creditors accepted the transfer and directed the plaintiff to
bring suit on the note when due. Held, 1. That so far as the trust for A.'s
wife was concerned, the plaintiff took the note as agent of A., and therefore
with its infirmity. 2. That the entire transaction by which the note was
transferred to the plaintiff was out of the regular course of business, and
that the note therefore remained open to the defence of fraud. Roberts v.
Hall, 760.
29. The wife of A. was living apart from him, but was not divorced. Held
not to affect the case. .d.
30. The taking of negotiable paper as payment of or security for a pre-
existing debt is not out of the regular course of business. Id.
31. The question whether negotiable paper was taken in the regular course
of business resolves itself into the inquiry whether mercantile paper is ordi-
narily used in the manner in which the paper in question was used, and
whether a business man would ordinarily have received the paper, in the
circumstances in which it was offered, and parted with his property for it. Id.
32. A statute of Mississippi enacted that any promissory note or other
contract for the payment of money executed in that state between March Ist
1862 and May 1st 1865, should be prina facie payable in Confederate notes
unless it appeared otherwise on the face of the contract. On a bill iq chan-
cery to foreclose a mortgage given to secure such a note and a decree pro
conqfesso for want of an answer, there being no proof to show the note to be
payable in other money, the reference to the master should have been to
ascertain the value of Confederate notes. Mezeik v. AltcGraw, 790.
BOND. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 6 ; SURETY, 5.
1. A bond will not be reformed by striking out portions alleged to be
erroneous, in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in conformity
with a previous agreement. Garner v. Bird et al., Ex'rs., 62.
2. The fact that the obliger employed a lawyer who gave him bad advice
and thereby induced him to sign the bond, furnishes no authority to a court
to alter the contract. Id.
3. Inattention or forgetfulness of the time, place, or person to whom a
bond is to be paid will not excuse the non-payment. Spring v. Fisk, 276.
4. Where a bond is signed by an illiterate person upon misrepresentations
as to its contents it is not his deed, but is void ab initio. In such case it is
not material whether the obligee had knowledge of the misrepresentation or
not. But where the contents are correctly stated, but the obliger is induced
to sign it by misrepresentations of facts, it is his bond, though he may avoid
it for the fraud. Schuylkill Co. v. Copley, 783.
BOUNDARY. See DEED, I ; EJECTMtENT, 1 ; EVIDENcE, 24.
I. A lot of land was described in a grant as "1 beginning at a stake stand-
ing on the bank or edge of Round Lake, thence," &c. (describing three lines
of the lot), 1" to a stake standing on the westerly bank or edge of the said
lake, and thence following the several courses of the said bank or edge to the
place of beginning." ffeld, 1. That the title under the grant extended to
the margin of the lake, and was not limited by a stake standing on the bank.
2. That the grantee was entitled to land formed in front of the lots by the
gradual receding of the waters of the lake. Under a grant of a "lake,"
reserving to the grantor all mines and minerals, the soil of the lake passes.
Burke v. Nilesq 118.
2. A line established under a parol compromise will be supported and is
not affected by the Statute of Frauds. Kellum v. Smith, 533.
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3. A line as actually run, takes precedence of one given in a deed. Knowles
v. 12bothaker, 601.
4. Calls in a deed are always controlled by lines on the ground. Craft v.
Yeaney, 797.
BRIDGE. See CONTRACT, 2; HIGHWAY, 3.
BROKER.
1. A real estate broker finding a purchaser for the land of his principal is
entitled to his commissions, although the principal vary the price or terms
of the sale. Woods v. Stephens, 193.
2. The compensation for procuring the loan of money being fixed by
statute, cannot be enlarged in a particular case by any testimony. Perrine v.
Hotchkiss, 345.
3. One employed to sell real estate and setting on foot negotiations result-
ing in a sale, cannot be deprived of compensation by discharge previous to
the consumemation. Gillet v. Corum, 402.
4. A broker buying stock for another and being ready at any time to deli-
ver it, may recover for the money advanced, Ithdugh there might have been
times when no stock was in his name. Wynkoop v. Seal, 404.
5. Shares of stock are the same and a transfer made by another of the
stock would have been a compliance with the ,broker's contract. Id.
6. The defendant in the month of March put into the hands of the plaintiff,
a real estate broker, for sale, a house in a certain city street, at the price of
$6500; the plaintiff to receive a commission of 1 per cent. if he sold the
house, the defendant to have the right to sell it himself without being liable
to a commission, and the plaintiff not to advertise. The plaintiff entered the
house on his books, and in December and January following advertised houses
for sale on that street. G., who lived on the'street and was desirous of find-
ing a house near by for a friend, saw the advertisement and went to the plain-
tiff's office and learned that the defendant's house was for sale. He informed
his friend, and the latter went to the defendant and negotiated with him for
it and finally purchased it. The purchaser did not see the plaintiff nor go to
his office, and G.'s action in the matter was wholly voluntary: Held, that the
plaintiff was entitled to his commission. Lincoln v. ffcClatchie, 634.
7. A sale made by the defendant, upon which the plaintiff was to have no
commission, held to mean a sale to a purchaser found by the defendant
wholly without the plaintiff's procurement. .d.
8. The plaintiff, by some misunderstanding, had altered the entry of the
price on his books from $6500 to $6000, and gave the latter price to G. when
he inquired. The defendant's price remained $6500, and he sold the house
for $6400: Held, that the plaintiff was still entitled to his commission. Id.
CANAL. See CORPORATION, 4.
CAPTURE. See WAR, 1.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.
- v. - , 3 C. E. Green 454, commented on. Cowart v. Perrine, 202.
Post v. Avery, 5 W. & S. 509, commented on. Forrester v. Torrence, 352.
Peoples v. Knowles, 15 Mich. 408, approved. Fisher v. People, 480.
Millingar v. Sorg, 5 P. F. Smith 215, commented on. Lawrence v. Luhr,
535.
Martin r. Highway Commissioners, 4 Mich. 557, approved. Township of
Leoni v. Taylor, 537.
Lindauer v. Fourth National Bank, 55 Barb. 75, approved. Dod v. Fourth
National Bank, 600.
Dickerson v. Wason, 54 Barb. 230, commented on. Dod v. Fourth National
Bank, 600.
Laxidon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251, overruled. Lord v. Litchfeld, 493.
Atwater v. Woodbridgc, 6 Conn. 223, overruled. Lord v. Litchfield, 493.
Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335, overruled. Lord v. Litchfield, 493.
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Trudo v. Anderson, 10 Mich. 357, approved. Ballou v. O'Brien, 669.
Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 7 Wright, 350, distinguished. Beatty
v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 745.
Inland Ins. Co. v. Stauffer, 9 Casey, 397, distinguished. Beatty v. Ly.oming
Ins. Co., 745.
CHAMPERTY.
Assignment of a bid at a chancery sale, after the sale is set aside and a
resale made, is void for champerty. Newland v. Gaines, 194.
CHARITABLE USE.
1. The statute of 1702 with regard to gifts for charitable uses provides
that all lands and estates that have been or shall be given by the General
Assembly or by any town or person for the maintenance of the ministry of
the gospel or for any other public and charitable use, shall for ever remain
and be continued to such use, and shall be exempt from the payment of taxes.
Held, that this statute did not constitute a contract between the state and
either the donors or the donees of such charitable gifts, that the property so
given should for ever be exempt from taxation, and that therefore a statute
making it taxable in certain cases, was not unconstitutional. Lord v. Litch-
field, 493.
2. If to be regarded as such a contract, a lease of tile property for 999
years for a gross sum, without a reservation of rent, would be such a viola-
tion of the condition of the contract that the state would no longer be bound
by it. Id.
CHECK. See AGENT, 15.
CHURCH. See COURTS, 5 ; FRAUDS OF STATUTE, 7.
CITIZEN. See ADMIRALTY, 3, 5.
COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD, 9.
1. Showing that a loss was by some vis major, as a flood, is excused with-
out affirmative proof that he was guilty of no negligence. Reading Railroad
Co. v. Reeves, 63.
2. Steam towboats or tugs are not common carriers as regards the vessels
they have in tow and their cargoes. Brown v. Clegg, 63.
3. In the late civil war the troops of the United States were a "1 public
I enemy," against whose act a common carrier did not insure. Soutlhern Express
Co. v. W moack, 194.
4. The fact that the freight has been paid in an illegal currency, does not
affect the liability for loss from negligence. Id.
5. Where goods are delivered to a transportation company to be trans-
ported over a continuous line of several railroads, an intermediate company
is liable for a loss happening upon its part of the line. Barter ,. Co. v. Wheeler,
195.
6. W"here a contract is made in one state to transport goods over a line
extending through two or more states, the parties will be governed by the
laws of the state where the loss happens. Id.
7. Tie exception of a loss by fire in a bill of lading of common carriers
by water, does not extend to losses by fire on railroads forming part of the
route. Id.
8. Where several common carriers are associated in a continuous line of
transportation, and in the course of the business, goods are carried through the
connected line for one price under an agreement by which tie freight-money
is divided among the associated carriers, in proportions fixed by the agree-
ment ; if the carrier at one end of the line receives goods to be transported
through marked for a consignee at the other end of the line, and on delivery
of the goods takes pay for transportation through, the carrier, who so receives
the goods, is bound to carry them, or see that they are carried, to their final
destination, and is liable 'or an accidental loss happening in anly part of the
connected line. Lock Co. v. Railroad Co., 244.
9. In an action against a carrier for injury to goods, an instruction that
"if the jury believe from the evidence that the loss of the coffee in contro-
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versy was within one of the exceptions contained in the bill of lading-that
is to say, if it was occasioned by perils of navigation of the lakes and rivers,
then the burden of showing that this loss might have been avoided by the
exercise of proper care and skill is upon the plaintiff; then it is for him to
show that the loss was the result of negligence," was a correct statement of
the law, and should have been given. Western Transportation Co. v. Downer,
360.
10. Where the carrier has given evidence from which the jury may infer
that the injury occurred from a cause excepted in the bill of lading, the bur-
den is cast on the plaintiff to show negligence. 11.
11. An instruction that "the bill of lading in this case excepts the defend-
ant from liability from perils of navigation, it is incumbent on the defendant
to bring itself within the exception, and it is the duty of the defendant to
show that it has not been guilty of negligence," is erroneous. Id.
12. The terms "dangers of lake navigation" include all the ordinary perils
which attend navigation on the lakes, and among others, that which arises
from shallowness of the waters at the entrance of harbors. Id.
13. A presumption of negligence from the simple occurrence of an accident
seldom arises except where the accident proceeds from an act of such a char-
acter that, when due care is taken in its performance, no injury ordinarily
ensues from it in similar cases, or where it is caused by the mismanagement
or misconstruction of a thing over which the defendant has immediate control,
and for the management or construction of which he is responsible. Id.
14. Are liable in two capacities ; one as insurers and one as warehouse-
men-in the former they are liable for any injury unless from the act of God
or public enemies, in the latter unless they have exercised due care as ware-
housemen. Goodwin v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 404.
15. Are bound to deliver the goods transported by them, and merely placing
the goods on their wharf where they cannot be obtained by consignee is not a
delivery. Id.
16. After arrival of goods and notice, and the elapsing of a reasonable
time, the liability as insurers ceases. Id.
17. If negligence is proved common carriers are liable though their duty
as such has ended. I'd.
18. The measure of damages in an action for failure to transport, where
plaintiff could not procure another conveyance, does not apply where such
conveyance might have been obtained. Grund v. Pendergast, 405.
19. General expressions of exemption from liability do not apply to inju-
ries resulting from wrongful acts. Keeney v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 662.
20. A general carrier of freight has no right to discriminate in forwarding
freight, in favor of one class to the prejudice of others. Keeney v. Grand
Trunk-R. Co., 663.
21. The reception by an express company of a package for transportation
directed to a point beyond its route, and the receipt of the entire compensa-
tion for the transportation to that point, is sufficient to make out a primnefacie
case of contract to carry and deliver the package to that point. St. John v.
Southern Express Co., 777.
22. To avoid liability in such case the company must show a specific con-
tract to carry only to its own terminus, or a settled and uniform rule not to
assume liability beyond that point, which rule must be brought home to the
consignee either by express notice or by a notoriety so general that lie may
fairly be presumed to have had notice. Id.
23. Plaintiff delivered a package marked to a consignee in New York, to
defendants an express company in Mobile, paid the freight for the entire dis-
tance, and took a receipt stating "that this company is to forward the same
to its agent nearest or most convenient to destination only, and then to deli-
ver the same to other parties, they to complete the transportation ; such
delivery to terminate all liability of this company for such package." The
company's route extended only to Lynchburg, but it haul an arrangement
with Adams Express Company to transport such packages to any point on
the latter's route, and receive a pro rata share of the freight. Held, that the
Adams Express Company was the agent of defendants within the terms of
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the receipt, and defendants were liable for failure to deliver in New York.
St. John v. Southern Express Co., 777.
24. If an express company have a settled and uniform rule that money
packages must be sealed and endorsed in a certain manner, and such rule is
brought home to the knowledge of the consignor who neglects or intention-
ally omits to comply with it, and the company, in ignorance of the special
value of the package, takes ordinary care of it only, the company will not
be liable for its loss. Id.
25. If, however, the money is stolen or converted by an agent of the com-
pany, the latter will be liable for its value on a count for money had and
received, notwithstanding the violation of its rules by the consignor. Id.
26. The consignee of goods carried by railroad, if present on their arrival,
must remove them without unreasonable delay, if he is not present the car-
rier must notify him. Fenner v. Buffalo Railroad, 795.
27. If consignee cannot be found, and the carrier places the goods in his
storehouse, his liability as carrier ceases after a reasonable time. Id.
28. Where a jettison becomes necessary by reason of a storm, the loss is
by act of God, and in order to make the carrier liable, there must be an ex-
press agreement to that effect. Price v. Hartshorn, 796.
CONDITION.
I. The burden of proof is on the party entering on land for breach of con-
dition, to show that such entry is justifiable. Marble Co. v. Ripley, 198. "
2. Where a city charter provides that in opening streets compensation shall
be made by a jury, where no agreement can be made, the attempt to make
an agreement is a condition precedent to the other power. Leslie v. St.
Louis, 602.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See BILLS AND NOTES, 32; CusTOMS, 2 ; MORT-
GAGE, 2.
I. During the late civil war the courts of South Carolina had no jurisdic-
tion over parties residing in Maryland by which their rights could be injuri-
ously affected, although suit was commenced by said parties in the courts of
South Carolina before the war, and the proceedings were in regard to land
in that state. The jurisdiction, however, it attached was suspended during
the war. Livinqston v. Jordan, 51.
2. The stepfather as next friend of two infants filed a petition in chancery
in South Carolina, asking a decree to confirm a certain sale of land of the
infants, situate in South Carolina. After reference to a commissioner a
decree of confirmation was made and a deed executed by the commissioner
to the purchaser. The stepfather and infants resided in Maryland, and the
petition set forth that the stepfather was guardian, but in fact both infants
had at the time of filing the petition attained the age at which guardianship
ceased in Maryland, and both became suifirns by the laws of South Carolina
before the decree. Held, that the court of equity had no jurisdiction to make
the decree, and no title passed to the purchaser. Id.
3. The rights of parties inside the Confederate lines were not affected by
proceedings to foreclose a mortgage inside the Federal lines during the war.
Dean v. Nelson, 69.
4. Property was not subject to seizure as abandoned under the Act of Con-
gress of March 12th 1863, unless the owner was engaged in the rebellion,
either in arms or otherwise. Hart v. Reynolds, 191.
5. Property left in the care of another person under a colorable sale, is
not abandoned. Id.
6. To bring a payment in Confederate currency within the rule as to exe-
cuted contracts it is not necessary that the payment be of the entire sum due,
nor that it be endorsed as a credit on a note. Cross v. Sells, 195.
7. A party who has sold property for Confederate notes cannot refuse to
accept them, and bring trover for the property. Williams v. Elkins, 195.
8. Confederate notes during the existence of the " Confederate States"
possessed sufficient elements of value to support a contract. Naff v. Craw-
ford, 195.
9. The judgment in Thorington v. Smith, 9 Wall. 1, holding that the use
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of Confederate notes by parties who had no illegal purpose, wa not unlaw-
ful, approved. Sherfy v. Argebright, 196.
10. Confederate notes as a consideration from one in the Confederate lines
to one in the loyal states, are not a valid and legal consideration. Conley v.
Burson, 196.
11. A power of attorney from one in the loyal states to one in the Con-
federate, tq sell land, was revoked by the war. Id.
12. A note placed in the hands of an agent for collection and paid in
Confederate notes, did not release the debtor. Scruggs v. Luster, 196.
13. Where a debtor transferred a note payable in Confederate notes, to be
credited if paid, otherwise he to stand bound, it was not a contract to pay in
Confederate notes. Marshall v. Dodson, 196.
14. The seizure by a Confederate colonel, within the Confederate lines, of
arms, was justifiable under the belligerent rights of the Confederate States.
Cummings v. Diggs, 196.
15. The exclusion of evidence of the official character of the defendant was
error. .Xd.
16. In an action of trespass a plea attempting to justify an act under the
belligerent powers of the Confederate States, is defective if it fails to show
the defendant was a soldier. Bayless v. Estes, 196.
17. It is no defence to a note, that it was !given for a horse which the seller
knew was to be used in the " rebel service." Gillam v. Looney, 197.
18. A payee taking payment in Confederate notes, being at the time within
Confederate lines, but there being no threats or force used by the payor, is
not sufficient duress to avoid the payment. Rollings v. Cate, 198.
19. The voluntary residence of a person within the Confederate lines
during the rebellion, did not, under the Act of July 17th 1862, incapacitate
him from making a will ; at any rate, not further than as against the United
States. Corbutt v. Nutt, 206.
20. The payee of a note payable in two years in current bankable funds,
given during the Confederacy, is entitled after its overthrow to recover in
United States currency. Taylor v. Turley, 472.
21. Only the life estate is sold where realty is seized, confiscated, and sold
under the Act of Congress of July 17th 1862-and the limitation law of
February 20th 1864 of the state of Kansas does not prevent recovery by the
reversioner. Dewy v. McLain, 472.
22. Judgments of the courts of Georgia during the war are valid judg-
ments so far as relates to parties within their jurisdiction. French v. Tumlin,
641.
23. A judgment of a court of Georgia, in November 1861, for the pur-
chase-money of slaves, was a valid judgment when entered, and may he
enforced now. Id.
24. The provisions of the Constitution of Georgia that "no court shall
have jurisdiction to enforce any debt the consideration of which was a slave
or the hire thereof," so far as it relates to contracts valid when made, is
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void. Ad.
25. A bank incorporated by the state of Georgia in 1854 having become
insolvent, suit was brought by a holder of its notes and judgment recovered
at law. The creditor then filed a bill against some of the stockholders for
the unpaid balance of their subscriptions. The stockholders set up in defence
that the notes on which the judgment was founded were issued by the bank
directors to the Confederate States and in aid of the rebellion, and were there-
fore void under the Constitution of Georgia of 1868, which nullifies all
contracts made during the war and in aid thereof, and all notes or other
evidences of such contracts. Held, that if such defence existed it should
have been made to the action at law, and the court of equity could not now
go behind the judgment. Marsh v. Burroughs, 718.
26. But even if such defence were still open, the Constitution of Georgia
could not impair the obligation of contracts existing at its adoption. Id.
27. The fact that the Constitution of 1868 was revised by Congress and
certain conditions imposed, before the admission of the state to representa-
tion, did not give such Constitution the force of an Act of Congress. Id.
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28. Whatever may have been the precise status of Georgia after the war,
the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 has been recognised by the political
department of the Federal Government as the act of the people of Georgia,
aud it must therefore be so regarded by the courts. Marsh v. Burroughs, 718.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 2.
1. The statute of the state where the suit is brought is alone applicable to
a cause of action accruing in another state. Carson v. Hunter, 64.
2. A contract for the payment of money made and to be executed in a
foreign country, is payable only in the lawful money of that country. Corn-
stock v. Smith, 600.
3. The proof of the value of foreign money is such as will enable the jury
to express the value of the sum in our money. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See CONFEDEa&TE STATES, 24, 26, 27; TAxA-
TION, 4.
I. Power of Legislature.
1. An act of the legislature creating a reform school, and providing for
the summary commitment to it of.children who are "destitute of proper
parental care and growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice,"
is unconstitutional, as it prescribes a virtual imprisonment without due pro-
cess of law. People v. Turner, 366.
2. Besides the objection to the summary method of proceeding prescribed,
such an act, so far as it restrains liberty for any cause except actual crime, is
in violation of the Bill of Rights, which declares that all men have certain
inherent rights, among which is liberty. Id.
3. The rights of the state and of parents over children, stated and discussed
by Tn oNToN, J. Id.
4. A state statute ploviding that in all suits founded on any debt or con-
tract made prior to 1865 or in renewal thereof, the plaintiff should not have
a verdict or judgment until he had made it clear to the tribunal trying the
same, that all legal taxes chargeable by law upon the same had been duly
paid for each year since the making of the debt or contract; and that the
giving in of the debt for taxation and payment of the taxes should be a con-
dition precedent to a recovery, is unconstitutional, as far at least as regards
debts or contracts made before its passage. Lathrop v. Brown, 638.
5. A law providing for the expenditure of certain taxes on two distinct
roads and for the construction of a third, is repugnant to the 20th section of
article 4 of the Constitution of Michigan, "providing that no law shall
embrace more than one subject." People ex rel. Estes v. benahy, 664.
6. A statute providing that no person shall sell intoxicating liquors with-
out a permit, to be granted by the county judge, if on application he shall
-be satisfied that the applicant is a person "of good moral character," and
that certain other requisites of the law are complied with, is constitutional.
In re Ruth, 767.
II. Power of Congress.
7. No citizen of Maitne can be deprived of his right to vote under the
Act of Congress of March 2d 1865, c. 79, until after conviction and sen
tence of a court martial of the United States. State v. Symonds, 135.
CONTRACT. See FRAUD, 6.
1. Where the minds of the parties to a contract do not fneet upon the
whole terms of such contract, the same is void. Fullerton v. Dalton, 345.
2. A contract for the construction of all the grading, earthwork, and ma-
sonry for the road-bed of a railroad from a certain station to the Kennebec
river, includes work on the foundation of a bridge across the said river.
Rogers v. Hogan, 664.
CONTRIBUTION.
1. A traveller passing over a bridge Which was maintainable by two coun-
ties, was injured by its breaking down. He recovered damageg in an action
for negligence against one of the counties. Held, that county might recover
contribution from the other. Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 796.
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2. Contribution is fixed on general principles of natural justice, and dops
not spring from contract. Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 796.
CONVERSION. See WILL, 16.
CORPORATION. See BiLLS AND NOTES, 3.
1. The acceptance of an Act of Assembly by a corporation may be inferred
from the exercise of corporate powers. Lyons v. 0. A. and 11. Railroad Co,
125.
2. By accepting the privileges conferred by a charter, the grantees will be
required to perform the conditions imposed. Id.
3. A corporator cannot plead an amendment of the charter made without
his consent when sued upon a contract with the corporation. Hope Mlut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Beekman, 197.
4. The use of a canal of an incorporated company cannot be restrained
by injunction on allegations of injuries to private parties by its use or con-
struction. Union Canal Co.'s Appeal, 405.
5. The Constitution does not require consequential injuries to property to
be prepaid. Id.
6. The stockholders in a railroad are not competent as jurors to determine
the necessity or compensation of taking land for the use of the railroad.
Peninsular Railway v. Howard, 405.
7. The liability imposed upon the directors and officers of a corporation,
to pay all debts exceeding the amount of capital paid in, is a penalty, and
can only be enforced in tile state chartering such corporation. First Nat.
Bank v. Price, 472.
8. A corporation has no other powers than such as are specifically granted
in its charter, or such as are necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect
those expressly granted. Vandall v. Dock Co., 506.
9. A corporation formed "to buy, improve lease, sell, &c., real estate,"
may expend its funds for any purpose the direct and proximate tendency of
which is to enhance the market value of its land, though the money is not
expended on the land itself, e. g., it may assess its stockholders for aid to a
railroad which does not touch its lands, but which by giving increased facili,
ties of access enhances their value. Id.
10. The word "1 improve" used in such connection with real estate, means
to enhance its market value. .d.
11. A corporation taking a greater rate of interest than is authorized by
its charter may be proceeded against for a forfeiture. Attorney-General v.
Boatmen's Say. Inst., 743.
12. The note of a corporation signed by the secretary, as secretary, is not
the note of the secretary personally. Gaff v. Theis, 743.
13. A company owning land and having power to mortgage, gave a mort-
gage of all their estate and property real and personal ; the mortgage covered
the land, whether it was necessary to the enjoyment of its franchises or not.
Robinson v. Atlantic 4- G. W. R. Co., 796.
14. A receiver of all the mortgaged property having been appointed, the
land was in legal custody and could not be levied on. Id.
15. Whether the land should pass into the hands of a receiver, could be
determined only by the court that appointed him. Id.
COSTS.
The costs of a defendant incurred in partition at law arrested by a court of
equity, will be allowed out of the proceeds of the sale. Hall v. Piddock, 350.
COURTS. See CONFEDERATE STATES, I.
1. The county courts of different states bounded by a river, have con-
current jurisdiction of crimes committed on the river opposite to such
counties. Carlisle v. The State, 64.
2. Where the record of a suit at the time it is removed from a state to a
Federal court under the Act of 1789, shows the matter in dispute to exceed
$500, a subsequent reduction of the demand by the plaintiff in his pleadings
will not entitle him to have the case remanded. Roberts v. Nelson, 115.
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3. Nor will the fact that the suit as developed by the pleadings subsequent
to the removal, includes a claim not cognisable in a Federal court, entitle it
to be remanded. The jurisdiction of the Federal court having once attached,
no subsequent event can divest it. Roberts v. Nelson, 115.
4. In August 1870 an action was commenced in the Supreme Court of
New York by summons, commanding defendant to appear or have judgment
entered against him for $330, with interest from July 1st 1858. Before any
other steps were taken the defendant appeared and filed a petition to have
the case removed to the United States Circuit Court on the ground that lie
was a citizen of Minnesota. The state court granted the petition and the
cause was removed. Plaintiff then filed his declaration in the Circuit Court
showing a claim for $187.25, with interest from January Ist 1859, and also
another claim for $43.25, as assignee of one Pierce, a citizen of New Jersey,
and thereupon moved to remand the case to tile Ncw York court. Hdd, that
the cause could not be remanded. Id.
5. Civil courts will interfere with churches or religious associations
when rights of property or civil rights are involved, but where there is no
other right involved than the clerical office, the decision of an ecclesiastical
court as to its own jurisdiction under the canons of the association, is con-
clusive. Chase v. Cheney, 295.
6. The right to preach the gospel to all who choose to listen is free to every
citizen, but the right to preach it as a clergyman of an organized church with
established doctrines and forms of worship, is limited by the will of the
church, and when a minister enters a church he becomes bound by the rules
and subject to the authority of the ecclesiastical government of the church.
.d.
7. By the canons of the Episcopal Church when a presentment against a
presbyter for non-conformity is made in due form and citation is issued and
served, the ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction to proceed to determine the
cause. Id.
8. The recital by the Bishop in the commission that he acted on "credible
information" does not affect the regularity of the proceedings. The canon
requires the bishop to appoint three persons to examine and make presentment,
and such appointment need not be in writing. Id.
9. The presentment is the substantial foundation of the proceedings, and
its sufficiency cannot be inquired into by a civil court. Id.
10. Even if the sufficiency of the presentment could be inquired into by a
civil court, it is not to be tested by the strict rules of criminal pleading, and
sufficient certainty to enable the accused to know the nature and substance
of the charge is all that can be required. Id.
I1. Per LAwRENCE, C. J., and SHELDON, J., dissenting: The civil courts
ought to take cognisance of the case so far as to ascertain whether the eccle-
siastical court is constituted in accordance with the canons of the church.
By joining the church, which is a voluntary organization, the presbyter agrees
to subinit to the jurisdiction of a tribunal organized in accordance with the
canons, but he has not agreed to submit to any other, and if a court impro-
perly constituted assumes to try him for an offence which may involve loss of
his ecclesiastical office, he has a right to invoke the protection of the civil
courts of the state. Id.
12. The acts of a court are valid and binding when once legally opened,
until it adjourns sine die or the term expires by law. Union Pacific I. R.
v. Hand, 472.
13. During the progress of a cause the court has entire control of the pro-
ceedings, and may correct mistakes in the docket entries. Nesbitt v. Logan,
474.
14. Mere change in the form of process, to make it conform to requirements
instituted by a Code, does not put an end to an action begun before the
adoption of the Code, nor make it a different action. Id.
15. There is no law for the removal to the state courts of causes cognisable
in the district or circuit courts of the United States. McCollom v. Pipe, 542.
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COVENANT. See EQuITY, 4; WARR.AxN.
1. A covenant not to sue on an obligation for a limited time after maturity,
cannot be pleaded in bar of a suit within the time. Irons v. Woodfill, 64.
. 2. The general covenant to warrant and defend includes the covenant for
quiet enjoyment, and is only broken by actual eviction. Rindskopf v.
armers' Loan Co., 277.
S. Courts of equity will not turn independent covenants into conditional,
because it will diminish litigation. Coursen v. Carfield, 279.
4. A covenant in a deed "That it is expressly understood that the houses
which may be erected on Gilbert street shall be set back ten feet," runs with the
land, and in equity may be enforced by a purchaser. Winfield v. Henning,
346.
5. A covenant to pay taxes on another's land, and one to make up any
deficiency in its sale below a certain sum, are independent. Eldridge v.
Bliss, 472.
CRIMINAL LAW.
I; In general.
1. A variance between the allegation in the indictment and the proof as to
where an offence was committed is not material if both places are within the
jurisdiction of the court. Carlisle v. The State, 64.
2. It is not error to charge "that if there is a well reasoned doubt on the
whole testimony," good character should protect the prisoner. Remsen v. The
People, 126.
3. A prisoner who puts his general character in issue takes the risk of its
being proved bad. Burdick v. The People, 276.
4. The neglect to aver facts essential to the description of an offence in an
imformation is fatal. Enders v. People, 473.
5. A statute which directs that notice of a special criminal term "shall be
posted up at the court-house door ten days before its commencement " is
directory only, and a person convicted at such term, notice of which was
posted only eight days, is not, for that reason, entitled to a new trial. Blynn
v. Commonwealth, 577.
6. Statutes creating crimes will not be extended by judicial interpretation
to cases not plainly and unmistakably within their terms. United States v.
Clayton, 737.
7. In statutes creating and defining criminal offences, the courts will not,
by construction, engraft words in one section upon those of another, unless
the legislative intention be plain and clear. Id.
II. Murder.
8. The question as to whether a homicide is justifiable or not, is essentially
one of fact, and for the jury under the evidence. Burdick v. The People,
276.
9. Under an information where in one count charging murder in first
degree all the degrees of homicide are also charged, a verdict finding the
prisoner guilty as charged cannot be sustained. The State v. Reddick, 406.
10. Drunkenness may, under peculiar circumstances repelling malice, reduce
the grade of the crime of homicide from murder to manslaughter. Blynn v.
Commonwealth, 577.
III. Burglary.
Ii. Mere possession by a person of stolen goods taken on the occasion of a
burglary, without other facts indicative of guilt, is not primd facie evidence
that such person committed the burglary. Phillips v. People, 125.
12. An indictment charging the commission of a burglary on a day
subsequent to the finding of the indictment may be amended on demurrer.
State v. Blaisdell, 197.
IV. Forgery.
13. Where a person intrusted with checks, signed in blank, for a particular
purpose, uses them for his own account, it is forgery. State v. Kroeger, 744.
V. Larceny.
14. On an indictment for larceny of promissory notes, evidence that they
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were of the currency denominated greenbacks, of the denomination of $100
bills, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. 1?emsen v. People, 126.
VI. Forcible Entry and Detainer.
15. In an action of forcible entry and detainer, the title as between the
parties is not a matter in issue. Van Eaman v. Walker, 200.
VII. Malicious Prosecution.
16. A criminal prosecution begun merely for the purpose of compelling a
debtor to pay, is prinmafacie evidence of want of probable cause, and malice.
Schmidt v. lVeidman, 203.
17. Civil liability is no probable cause for instituting criminal proceed-
ings. Id.
CUSTOM. See INSURANCE, 14.
CUSTOMS.
1. Payment of duties to a Confederate collector of customs during the
war was not in effect a payment to the United States, and is no defence to an
action on the customs bond. United States v. Lowe, 455.
2. The fact that such payment was made under threat of a sale of the
goods by the Confederate authorities, did not make such payment a defence
to the bond. The Confederate officer as to this matter was a mere tres-
passer. Id.
3. By the acceptance of a bond for payment of duties within three years,
the goods meanwhile to remain in the public stores at the port of entry, the
United States did not assume any duty as insurer or even as bailee of the
goods ; and the facts that for several years there was no United States col-
lector present at that port to receive the duties and deliver the goods, and
that the goods were taken possession of by an insurrectionary government,
do not constitute any defence to the bond. Id.
DAMAGES. See CoMMoN CARRIER, 18; ELECTION, 1; INJUNCTIoN, 2; RAIL-
ROAD, 3; SEDUCTION; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 8.
1. Where the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff of his determination
not to accept an engine furnished under agreement that it should be satisfac-
tory, and allowed defects to be remedied, it was held to be a waiver of all
claims for damages on account of such defects. Cassid. v. Le Fe e, 124.
2. In trespass de bonis asportatis against an officer for selling one man's
goods under an execution against another, the damages are compensatory
only, in the absence of malice. .Beveridge v. Rawson, 133.
3. The measure of damages in an action for detention of water from plain-
tiffs' manufactory is the value of the use of the waters, and not the profit on
the goods they could have manufactured. Pollitt v. Long, 277.
4. Smart-money may be allowed as damages in actions of tort founded on
the malicious or wanton misconduct or culpable negligence of the defendant.
Melch v. Durand, 566.
5. Tile expenses of litigation may be taken into consideration in assessing
the damages in any case where smart-money may be allowed. Ad.
6. Where the defendant fired a pistol, the ball of which glanced and hit
the plaintiff, and it was found that the injury was unintentional but was the
result of gross and culpable carelessness on the part of the defendant, it was
held-1. That trespass vi et armis would lie. 2. That the expenses of the
litigation might be considered in awarding damages to the plaintiff. Id.
7. The damages for forcibly taking possession of certain wheat and selling
it, is the highest price of the wheat at any time between the taking and sale.
Ellis v. Wire, 665.
8. The damages for delay to transmit an order to buy stock, in a suit
against a telegraph company, is the amount lost by the advance of the stock.
Rittenhouse v. Independent T. Co., 800.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
I. Sale or Conveyance Fraudulent as to Creditors.
1. If an insolvent debtor takes notes payable to his wife where the consid-
eration moves from him, with intent to delay his creditors, the notes will be
INDEX.
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treated as an assignment to the wife and fraudulent as to creditors. Reppy v.
Reppy, 65.
2. Although one may have intended to defraud the creditors of another by
taking and converting his property into cash, such intention will become
harmless by his subsequently delivering the proceeds of sale to the debtor or
his wife. Cramer, Receirer, 4-c., v. Blood, 65.
3. To constitute an indirect conveyance of real estate to a married woman
by her husband within the meaning of R. S. c. 61, 1, Maine, the deed
from him must be one step in the conveyance to her, for her benefit. Bean
v. Boothby, 67.
4. Only a judgment creditor can seek relief in equity, on the ground that
real estate paid for by his debtor, has been fraudulently conveyed to his wife.
Grifin v. Nitcher, 68.
5. To avoid a sale upon the ground ihat it was fraudulent as to creditors,
it must appear that both the vendor and vendee were parties to the fraud.
Gridley v. Bigham, 127.
6. The conveyance of a party's property to his creditor is satisfaction of
his debt, and then receiving back security for the support of himself and wife
for life, is fraudulent and void as to the grantor's creditors. Morrison v.
Morrison, 197.
7. A wife who had commenced proceedings for divorce, was held to stand
in the relation of creditor and might avoid the conveyance. Id.
8. A subsequent or even contemporaneous attempt to convey or encumber
property so as to delay creditors, cannot affect a mortgage fairly given to
secure a bond jde creditor. Stillman v. Stillman, 346.
9. In Massachusetts a court of equity will set aside a fraudulent assign-
ment by a debtor of his choses in action to enable a creditor to proceed against
them. Tantum v. Green, 346.
10. The creditor is entitled to have mortgage-debts due the judgment-debtor
collected by a receiver. Id.
It. An assignee to be protected must have purchased for value and without
notice. Id.
12. The intention to prevent creditors from recovering their just debts, by
an act which withdraws the debtor's property from their reach, is fraud in fact.
MeKibbin v. Martin, 406.
13. Where a husband takes the title to land paid for by the wife, and then
conveys to another according to agreement, it is not a fraud on his creditors.
Sackett v. Spencer, 533.
14. If a creditor would hold land conveyed to the wife by husband's grantee
paid for out of husband's property, he must proceed by bill in equity and not
by levy. Webster v. Folsom, 603.
15. The New York Statute of Uses and Trusts only makes conveyances
fraudulent and void as against creditors of the grantor at the time of the con-,
veyance. Lovemore v. Campbell, 744.
16. Even though voluntary, it may be upheld against subsequent creditors.
.d.
I. Assignment for Creditors.
17. An assignment for the benefit of creditors is not void per se. Johnson,
Garnishee, v. Ingersoll, 473.
18. Property held under a valid assignment is not subject to attachment.
Id.
19. An attachment will he sustained against a debtor who has assigned his
property to defraud his creditors. Johnson v. Laughlin, 473.
20. An assignee and creditors are not purchasers for value within the Re-
cording Act of March 18th 1775. Spackmnan v. Ott, 534.
III. Other Matters.
21. A judgment-creditor who has exhausted his remedy at law, may file a
bill against persons holding property of his debtor which cannot be reached
by execution, and he need not join other creditors as complainants. 'Marsh
v. Burroughs, 718.
INDEX. 821
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
22. If in such case it appears by the pleadings or otherwise that distribu-
tion must be made pro rata among a certain class, the court will frame its
decree for the benefit of all. Marsh v. Burroughs, 718.
23. So a judgment-creditor may pursue any equitable interest of his debtor
in whosoever hands it may be without making third parties, although the
party sued may be entitled to contribution or indemnity from such'third per-
son. Id.
24. Subscriptions to capital stock of a corporation, wholly or partly un-
paid, are assets, even though never called in by the corporate authority, and
may be made available by creditors for the payment of their debts. Id.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE. See FRAUD, 2; SET-OFF, 6.
1. Advancement is always a question of intention. Weaver's Appeal, 192.
2. It is always a presumption that a parent means to treat his children
equally. Id.
3. All declarations of intent made by an ancestor in settling his property
among a set of children are admissible in evidence. Duling v. JoAnson, 192.
DECEIT. See ACT ON, 7.
Fraudulent intent being the gist of an action for deceit, it must be proved
that the party making the representations knew them to be false. Robinson
v. Aint, 346.
DEED. See HOMESTEAD, 4; STAMP, 1, 3; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.
1. A deed which refers to a plat of land for one of the lines of a boundary
may be read in evidence without the production of the plat. Dreery v. Cray,
62.
2. Manure in a stable-cellar does not pass, by a conveyance of the stable.
Proctor v. Gilson, 200.
3. The grantees of a quarry are not to be limited in the amount of stone
they are to take, unless there is an obvious restriction in the grant. Marble
Co. v. R ipley, 201.
4. The grantor in an absolute conveyance cannot show by a parol agree-
ment, that the grantee was to hold for his benefit, unless he proves fraud,
mistake, or accident. forral v. Waterson, 407.
5. Unsevered crops pass by a conveyance of the land. Tripp v. Hasceig,
473.
6. Equity will only reform a mistake in a deed where it is committed by
both parties and is admitted or proved. Id.
7. To constitute delivery it is necessary that the grantor should part with
A11 control over the deed. Burton v. Boyd, 534.
8. A deed in possession of grantor at his death is to be presumed as not
delivered. Id.
9. Courts of equity will not change deeds of conveyance or written evi-
dences of title, by proof of verbal agreements. Case v. Peters, 665.
10. There can be no delivery of a deed except by the express or presumed
assent of the grantee. Rogers v. Carey, 743.
DESCENT.
When a canon of descent makes the right of inheritance to depend on per-
sonal status, such status must be ascertained from the lex domicilii. Harvey
v. Ball, 65.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.
1. Evidence showing the affection and regard of the decedent for the do-
nee, is admissible to sustain a gift as a donatio causa mortis. Rhodes v.
Childs, 347.
2. Donationes causa mortis are revocable by the donor, and ambulatory
during life. Id.
EASEMENT.
Where a grantor conveys certain lots bounding on a street or alley, neither
he nor his assigns can afterwards close the said street or alley. Cox v. James,
601.
INDEX.
EJECTMENT. See TENANT IN COMMON, 1.
1. In ejectment, plaintiff's title was derived from a sale for taxes by the
treasurer of Cambria county in 1822. The lands in suit were on or near the
boundary line, and from the generality of the description of the boundary
lines in the act incorporating the county, it could not be ascertained whether
the lands were in the county or not. By a later Act of 1849 commissioners
were appointed to "correctly run and distinctly mark the boundary line, &c.,
agreeably to the acts defining" the same. Held, that in the absence of evidence
proving the existence and recognition of a different line by the officers of the
county at the time of the sale in 1822, the line established by the commis-
sioners under the Act of 1849 must be treated as the original and true line.
Smith v. Brotherline, 50.
2. A defendant claiming title under the Act of Congress of March 3d
1807, must plead it in bar as an equitable defence, in an action of ejectment.
Lebeau v. Armitage, 126.
ELECTION.
1. A registered voter whose vote has been wilfully, corruptly, and fraudu-
lently refused by the judges of an election is entitled to recover such exem-
plary damages as the jury may consider proper. Elbin v. Wilson, 408.
2. The governor of a state is not "an officer of eldction" within the meaning
of section 22 of the Act of Congress of May 31st 1870 (16 Stats. at Large
145), which makes it criminal for any "election officer" fraudulently to make
any false certificate of the result of any congressional election. United States
v. Clayton, 737.
3. The relations of a state to the General Government, and of the gov-
ernor to both, referred to as showing the improbability that Congress would
(if its power be conceded) provide for the trial and imprisonment of this
officer for omitting or fraudulently performing election duties prescribed by
state laws. Id.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See HIGHWAY, 7.
ENTRY. See CONDITION, 1.
EQUITY. See ARBITRATION, 1; DEED, 9 ; PARTITION, 3.
1. The authority of a court of equity to reform a written instrument, does
not extend to any alteration of a contract made under a mistake of law.
Garner v. Bird, 66.
2. An allegation in an answer entirely impertinent to the bill cannot be
used as evidence for the defendant. Grinnell v. Bird, 70.
3. An objection to the jurisdiction of chancery on the ground of an ade-
quate remedy at law, is too late after answer filed. Magee v. Alagee, 128.
4. A'court of equity cannot strike out part of the covenants in a deed,
because they are oppressive to the grantee, where a corporation has voluntarily
bought lands charged by such covenants. Marble Co. v. Ripley, 197.
5. It is the settled doctrine that if the answer admits a contract, without
stating that it was not in writing, and setting up the Statute of Frauds, the
statute cannot be used as a defence. TWalker y. Hill, 276.
6. Non-performance of a beneficial parol agreement is not such a fraud as
will induce equity to compel performance. Id.
7. Courts of equity have peculiarly cognisance of matters of fraud, and
over instruments affected by fraud, and will declare them void on that account.
Monmouth Co. v. Hutchinson, 348.
8. A court of equity will never lend its active aid to a party who, by supe-
rior knowledge and artful silence, has gained an unfair advantage. Erie
Railroad v. Del. and L. Railroad, 351.
9. A bill praying that the conveyance of certain lots be decreed void, on
the ground that the respondent induced such conveyance by false and fraud-
ulent representations, will be sustained. Clark v. Robinson, 537.
10. Where there is a positive statutory remedy, which may be pursued,
equity cannot interfere on the ground of irreparable mischief. Lex nemini
facit injuriam. Brown's Appeal, 797.
11. Irreparable damage cannot be alleged against statutory remedies legally
pursued. Id.
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ERROR AND APPEAL. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 15 ; CRIMINAL LAW, 2;
EViDEvcE, 2; JUSTICE OF TIIE EACE; PRACTICE, 3; SLANDER, 2.
1. The erroneous instruction of the court in regard to the effect of a deed,
is no ground of reversal, if the plaintiff had no title on which the jury could
find in his favor. Dreery v. Cray, 66.
2. A party against whom no judgment has been rendered or final order
made, has no ground for a writ of error. Burton v. Boyd, 534.
3. A court of error will not reverse unless the jury have been misled by
tie instruction of the court below. Id.
4. A court of error will not reverse for refusal to grant a new trial. Pacific
Railroad Co. v. N'ash, 535.
5. Where the gist of the action is negligence it is not error to admit testi-
mony of all facts showing the degree of care necessary. id.
6. The Supreme Court will reverse where the court below has violated or
disregarded its own rules. Brennan's Estate, 535.
7. In an equity action, a court of error will not reverse on account of the
admission of improper evidence if such evidence could not have changed the
result. Kinq v. Whaley, 536.
8. A reviewing court will not set aside the finding of a court made without
a jury, where it is in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence.
Carson v. Kerr, 602.
ESTATES.
1. Contingent estates and interests are assignable in equity. P., W. and
B. Railroad v. Melplier, 411.
2. The creation and failure of an intermediate trust estate will not defeat
an ultimate remainder in fee limited upon two lives in being. King v.
Wh7aley, 535.
E'STOPPEL. See BANK, 4 ; INSUIRANCE, 33.
1. Where a party acting under a mistake of law or of fact does acts which
mislead the adverse party he is estopped, as well as if he was not acting
under such mistake. Garner v. Bjird, 66.
2. Estoppel shuts the month of a party whether his original act or declara-
tion was intended to deceive or not. Kirk v. Harhnan, 70.
3. Admission by the wife, that certain property levied on belonged to her
lhuband, would not be binding as an estoppel, in favor of other parties not
influenced by such admission. Irhedon v. Champlin, 475.
4. Silence will estop only where it is a fraud, it is different as to positive
acts. Lawrence v. Luhr, 535.
5. A reservation in a lease which becomes the subject of an agreement
with a third party, will not estop the lessor unless the lessee is a party to
such agreement. Chope v. Lorman, 602.
6. A person entitled to redeem real estate from sale on execution, is not
estopped by having told a purchaser to buy, and that lie should not be dis-
turbed. earitlers v. Weaver, 607.
EVIDENCE. See AoEXT, 3; CONFEDERTE STATES, 15 ; DEFFD, 1 ; DONATIO
MlORTIS CAUSA, I ; JUI)GOMENT, 5 ; LIMITATIONS, 5 ; PAITNEnsuIP, 8; SALE,
2; "III 1--ING, 12; SLANDER, 7; SrAIP, 3; UsuRi, 2; WILL, 2; WIT-
NESS, I.
I. Generallql.
1. The question of the effect of a deed delivered as an escrow, and its effect
as the evidence of a written contract to avoid the Statute of Frauds, are not
identical and should not be confounded. Coyger, Admn'x. v. Lansing, 126.
2. It is error to permit the defendant to prove the "di
s l
oy
a lty" of the
plaintiff, in an action of trespass for taking goods. Baisrt v. Ieyqnolds, 200.
3. If the political status is to be proved it must be done hy acts and not by
reputation. Id.
4. Proof that a horse was captured by Federal soldiers from two or three
person dre-scd as rebel soldiers, is not suflicient to defeat the right of the
owner from whom it hiad been stol.. (h(Se~lq v. I?,,dyers, 200.
5. The insanity of the endorser of a note from the time of' its issue until
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his death, is admissible to prove the invalidity of the transfer. Hannahs v.
Sholdon, 471.
6. The summons, returns, pleadings, and all other proceedings are admis-
sible under a plea of nul tie record. Nesbitt vY. Logan, 474.
7. In replevin for oats harvested by defendant from land cultivated for
several years by him, the plaintiff cannot offer title-papers to the land in
evidence. Caldwel v. Custard, 535.
8. In a suit against the defendant as endorser of a promissory note, the
question being whether the endorsement was genuine or forged, and the
defendant claiming that his name had been forged to a large number of notes
of the same maker, and that this was one of them, the plaintiffs introduced a
witness who testified that he received the note from the maker and sold it to
one E., from whom it appeared that the plaintiffs received it. Held, that on
cross-examination he might be inquired of as to having purchased other notes
with the defendant's name endorsed thereon, such evidence tending to show
that the witness might be mistaken in relation ito the particular note by con-
founding it With some of the others. Tyler v. Todd, 627.
9. The defendant testified in his own behalf that he had received forty-
eight notices of protest as endorser of notes of the same maker from banks
within a few months, and stated the amounts of the notes. Held, that this
evidence was admissible in connection with his previous testimony that he had
endorsed but one of the notes protested, as tending to prove that there was a
large number of forgeries, a fact material to be shown in order to establish an
alleged confederacy between the maker of the notes and certain other parties.
Id.
10. .Questions of this character, involving a great variety of transactions
with the accompanying circumstances, often require the testimony to take a
wide range. Id.
11. Where it does not appear clearly on what ground testimony objected
to was admitted, and it was admissible for any purpose, the court cannot
regard it as having been admitted for an improper purpose. Id.
12. Where an objectionable question was asked and was permitted on
objection by an auditor, but the witness in his answer stated only a fact that
was admissible in evidence, it was held that the impropriety of the question
was not a sufficient reason for setting aside the auditor's report. Id.
13. Where the same question was repeated and the witness answered it in
a manner that was in itself inadmissible, but the counsel at once disclaimed
it as evidence, it was held that the impropriety of the question and answer
was not a sufficient reason for setting aside the auditor's report. Id.
14. In a complaint for fraud in negotiating a sale of land, words used by
the vendor, but not inserted in the complaint, may be given in evidence if
they sustain the allegation. Updyke v. Abel, 743.
15. The record of proceedings in bankruptcy is only pri, d facie evidence
of the facts stated in it, and may be contradicted by parol. Feley v. Barr,
795.
II. Admissions, Declarations, 4-c. See ESTOPrpE, 3.
16. The declarations of a grantor after the grant, cannot be received to
affect the title of his grantee. Pier v. Duff, 66.
17. The admission during his tenancy, by one under whom plaintiff claims,
affects such plaintiff only. Id.
18. Declarations of tenants in common are not admissible against each
other. Id.
19. A declaration or admission, to be admissible in evidence, must be
entirely voluntary. Phillips v. The People, 125.
20. On the trial of an indictment for stealing a horse, it is not erroneous
to admit evidence of the accused taking a wagon on the same night. .d.
21. The statements of a vendor of land made after sale, are not admissible
to affect the vendee's title. Gridley v. Bingham, 127.
22. The declarations of one, of several owners of land, who enters into
possession, are competent to show such entry is not adverse. King v.
Whaley, 536.
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III. Copies, Hearsay.
23. Pedigree and boundary are the excepted cases wherein reputation and
hearsay of deceased persons are received in evidence. McCausland v. Flem-
ing, 63.
24. Ancient maps and surveys are evidence to ascertain boundaries and
fix monuments. Id.
25. Drafts offered for title must bear an -official character, but not when
offered for boundary. Id.
26. The unauthenticated roll of a company is not evidence of a member's
desertion. State v. Slmonds, 135.
27. The books of a bank are not competent to show the amount of paper
discounted for the defendant, in a suit between third parties. Perrine v.
Hotchkiss, 347.
28. An item of six dollars and sixty cents is the largest amount provable
by party's book and suppletory oath. Kelton's Adm'x v. Hill, 536.
29. When any part of a chancery record is read in evidence, the whole is
evidence. Thayer v. McGee, 536.
30. The record of a New York court showing that the parties had been
personally summoned is conclusive. WVetherill v. Stillman, 536.
31. Proof of jurisdiction cannot be required, if the court has assumed to
exercise it legally. Id.
32. Unexecuted papers are not evidence. Green v. Goble, 602.
33. Letter-press copies of correspondence are not originals, but must be
proved as secondary evidence. " Foot v. Bentley, 797.
34. To make a copy of a lost instrument admissible, the evidence of the
genuineness of the original must be of the most positive kind. Krise v.
Neason, 797.
35. V. and G. executed an agreement, and jointly delivered it to R. to
keep; he was the agent of both for that purpose. Id.
36. R.'s acknowledgment of a paper produced by him as the original, was
primd facie evidence of its genuineness. Id.
37. One witness swearing to the handwriting in a paper is sufficient to
take it to the jury, although he may be contradicted by any number of wit-
nesses or circumstances. .d.
38. The question of admissibility for the court is always the prima facies;
the sufficiency is for the jury. Id.
39. R. died; search amongst his papers was all that was required to admit
secondary evidence. Id.
IV. Experts. See WITNESs, 4, 7, 8.
40. The opinion of witnesses is no evidence. In re Sale of Infiants'
Lands, 278.
41. Opinions of witnesses are not competent to fix a price for the use of
credit. Perrine v. Hotchkiss, 345.
42. In an action against a surgeon for negligence and unskilfulness, in
consequence of which the plaintiff lost his hands and feet, and where the
evidence is conflicting, medical men called as scientific witnesses to give
their opinions, cannot be asked questions, the answers to which involve the
point which the jury have to determine, viz. : the negligence, &c., of the
defendant; as, to what they would attribute the loss of the plaintiff's hands
and feet. Kay v. Thompson, 594.
43. The opinions of experts as to the necessity of a jettison are competent.
Price v. HMurtshorn, 796.
EXECUTION. See HOx3ESTEAD, 3 ; JUDGMENT, 8; SURETY, 6.
1. The sheriff cannot sell lands not previously levied on, under a iendi-
tioni exponas. Ataupin v. Emmons, 748.
2. A purchaser at sheriff's sale acquires the interest of the defendant at
the date of the judgment, although he may have been adjudged a bankrupt
before the sale. .l4Aley v. Barr, 795.
3. A jadgment under which the land was sold being for purchase-money,
there was no exemption under the Bankrupt Law. Id.
4. The Court of Common Pleas in which a judgment is entered has
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jurisdiction after the defendant has been adjudged bankrupt, and a sale by
the sheriff would pass a perfect title to the purchaser. Fehley v. Barr, 795.
E-XECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See WARRANTY.
1. Commissions to accountants are due at the time the services are per-
formed. Parker's Estate, 408.
2. It is improper and unlawful for an executor to mix the funds of the
estate with his own. Id.
3. An executqr is not chargeable with interest when he pays within a
reasonable time after the funds are received. Id.
4. Until the executor qualifies he has no title to the personalty. Stagg v.
Green, 602.
5. An administrator who delays settling his account for ten years, and
uses the money in his own speculations, is chargeable with conpound interest,
and annual rests are to be made in his account for that purpose. Johnson's
Adrn'x v. Hedrick, 670.
6. A probate decree settling an executor's account is not conclusive evi-
dence of his liability in money for the balance with which he is charged.
That sum represents a balance of the estate undisposed of remaining for dis-
tribution, and the decree while it stands is conchisive evidence that he had in
his hands those items of personal property. Sellew's Appeal, 708.
7. But where a mistake has been made in the settlement of the account,
'and property with which the executor is charged proves in fact to have been
'lost or destroyed when supposed to have been in existence or is subsequently
taken from the executor by a paramount title vhen it was supposed to belong
to the estate, the equity power of the court of probate is sufficient for the
correction of the mistake, which correction may be made upon an application
by the executor to the court for relief. .1d.
8. And where the same person is executor and trustee under a will, and
after the settlement of his account as executor there is a loss ot property
without his fault, the court of probate may afford him relief in the settlement
of his trustee account. Id.
9. In such a case the trustee ought to charge himself with the whole
amount which the court had ordered to be distributed to him and to credit
himself with any loss or depreciation of the pioperty, and the finding of the
court of probate ought expressly or by necessary implication to determine
the fact that he is entitled to those credits. Id.
10. Where an executor was also a trustee under the same will and by the
settlement of his account as executor was charged with a certain sum, and
by a later settlement of his trustee account was charged with a less sum, the
difference representing the loss or depreciation of property in his hands, it
was held on an appeal from a probate decree settling the trustee account,
that, as the record did not show precisely what the decree appealed from was,
the mere fact of the difference between the twQ accounts was not a sufficient
reason for reversing the decree. Id.
11. A will gave property to a trustee for the benefit of a daughter of the
testator, the income to be paid to her annually until she should reach the age
of twenty-five years, at which time the property was to be conveyed to her
absolutely, with a right on the part of the trustee in his discretion to convey
all the property to her before reaching that age, and with a bequest over tt
other relatives of the testator in case the daughter should die without issue
before the property was so conveyed to her. The daughter died without issue
before arriving at the age of twenty-five years. Previous to her death the
trustee had delivered to her a small portion of the trust estate : Held; that
the trustee under the provision authorizing him to convey to her all the pro-
lierty in his discretion before she should reach the age of twenty-five, had a
right to deliver to her such portion of the property as he thought best: Id.
12. Under the Statute of Missouri an administrator is not authorized tG
pay claims allowed, until an order of court is made. Dullard's Aba'x v.
Hardy, 742.
13. The rule which forbids an executor to purchase, or be interested in the
purchase of real estate sold to pay debts, is violated, if the executor becomes
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interested before confirmation, although not until after the property is struck
off; and the sale is thereby rendered void. Terwilliger v. Brown, 798.
14. The facts that the fair value of the premises was bidden, and the sale
was afterward confirmed, ex parte, will not give it validity. Id.
15. Nor is it material that the agreement, by which the executor became
interested, might be void under the Statute of Frauds. Id.
FACTOR. See AGENT.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER. See CRIMINAL LAW.
FORFEITURE See INSURANCE, 34; VENDOR AND PURCtrAs.ER, 7.
FRAUD. See BANK AND BANKER, I ; BOND, 4 ; EQUITY, 7 ; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 15.
1. Where one purchases land for several associates, it is a fraud to charge
them more than the price actually paid, and the excess may be recovered.
Short v. Stevenson, 67.
2. Where the presentation of a claim within the proper time has been pre-
vented by the fraudulent concealment of a deceased party, a bill in equity lies
to obtain satisfaction out of the surplus in the hands of the heirs. Sugar
River Bank v. Fairbanks, 197.
3. A delay to commence proceedings for four years after discovery of the
claim, is too long. Id.
4. Actual fraud is for the jury, legal fraud where the facts are ascertained
is for the court. McKibbin v. MAartin, 406.
5. The retention of possession by the vendor of chattels whenever they are
capable of delivery is a fraud in law. Id.
6. A party defrauded in a contract is not debarred of his rights, unless his
delay to assert them amounts to a waiver. Jartin v. Ash, 533.
FRAUDS OF STATUTE. See EQUITY, 5; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4.
1. Where a judgment-creditor agrees to accept the promise of a vendee of
land, to pay the judgment-debt which is a lien against it, and such debt is
credited against the purchase-money, the contract is not within the statute.
Bishears v. Rowe, 67.
2. A purchaser in possession of land, who has paid a portion of the consi-
deration and promised to pay the rest, cannot set up the statute, in a suit by
the vendor for the balance of the money. Cagger v. Lenninq, 135.
3. An agreement to sell "in consideration ofthe sum of '700," is sufficient
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, if signed by both parties. Foot v. Ifebb, 471.
4. A parol agreement made by the vendees of land at the time of a con-
veyance to them, cannot be enforced. Kiddv. Carson, 474.
5. Any credit given to a third party, prevents a recovery against a defend-
anr on a parol guarantee. Norris v. Graham, 474.
6. A parol promise to pay the debt of another in consideration of forbear-
ance to sue the original debtor, is within the statute and cannot be enforced.
Thomas v. Delplh, 474.
7. The right to use a church edifice for worship, is an interest in real
estate, and must be in writing and signed by the party, to be valid. Brum-
field v. Carson, 665.
8. An agreement, made by the owner of property, sold under a mortgage,
with the purchaser, for the owner to remain in possession and after paying
the debt and expenses take a reconveyance, being by parol, is void by the
Statute of Frauds. Loomis v. Loomis, 744.
GIFT.
1. Money deposited by a grandmother in a savings bank, to the credit of
her grandchildren, will be held on her death to be a perfected gift for 'them.
Gardiner v. AMerritt, 127.
2. A gift obtained by one standing in a confidential relation to the donor,
ii primd facie void, and the burden of proof is on the donee to show that it
was free, voluntary, and unbiassed. Todd v. Grove, 408.
3. The testimony of the wife is insufficient to prove the gift of a note, of a
third person, from the husband to the wife. Trowbridge v. 1lolden, 537.
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Failure of a lessor to notify the guarantors of the rent on a two years'
lease, of non-payment, for ten months, does not release their liability.
Leonard v. Shirts, 744.
HABEAS CORPUS.
A party held under arrest by virtue of legal process of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, cannot be discharged upon habeas corpus, on the ground that
the statute creating the offence is unconstitutional. In re Harris, 67.
HEIR. See WARRANTY; WILL, 8.
HIGHWAY. See ACTION, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5; RAILROAD, 12;
RIPARIAN OWNER, 2.
1. The legislature of Michigan have free power over the subject of laying
out, altering, or discontinuing highways, and this power they may exercise
directly or delegate to the Board of Supervisors. People ex rel. Bristol v.
Supervisors, 475.
2. The right to pass and repass upon a highway is hardly such a vested
right that the legislature would be incompetent to take away. id.
3. Townships are under no legal obligation to. keep in repair bridges and
culverts within their limits. Township of Leoni v. Taylor, 537.
4. The fact that when a resident of a city was injured by reason of a de-
fective way, which the city was bound to keep in repair, he was driving at a
"faster rate than six miles an hour," in violation of a city ordinance, is no
bar to his right to recover damages for such injury, if such driving did not
in any degree contribute to produce it. Baker v. City of Portland, 559.
5. The fact that the jury failed to agree upon the answer to the question
whether the plaintiff was driving at a faster rate than six miles an hour,
does not render it reasonably certain that a general verdict for the plaintiff,
in such action, is erroneous. Id.
6. The law imposes no duty upon the inhabitants of a town to remove an
obstruction from a highway unless he is a town officer. Ham v. Inhabitants
of Wales, 603.
7. A neighborhood road is not a private road, and the right of eminent
domain does not apply. Kissinger v. Hanselman, 665.
HOMESTEAD. See BANKRUPTCY, 15.
1. HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS OF THE SOUTHERN STATES, 1,
139.
2. Upon bill filed by a party paying the purchase-money of land, against
the purchaser who went into possession and occupied it as a homestead, pro-
mising to execute a mortgage for the repayment, the defendant cannot assert
a homestead exemption. Magee v. Magee, 127.
3. Neither the Constitution nor the statute exempts a contemplated future
homestead. Coolidge v. Wells, 409.
4. A deed by a husband, not signed by his wife, of homestead premises, is
wholly invalid: Phillips v. Stauch, 665.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See ESTOPPEL, 3; JOINT TENANT, 1.
I. MTfarriage, Divorce and Alimony.
1. Alimony is regarded as an allowance to the wife for present support,
and the husband must contribute it where the wife chooses. Morrison v; 3or-
rison, 198.
2. A marriage ceremony performed in jest and not intended to be a contract
of marriage, will be declared void by a Court of Chancery. .McClurg v.
Ferry, 279.
3. While in a bill for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, the specific acts
on which the charge rests must be set out, the evidence is not necessarily
limited to the particular facts charged. Briggs v. Briggs, 409.
4. A parol contract to marry, not to be performed for more than ai year, is
void under the Statute of Frauds. Nichols v. Wearer, 410.
5. An organic defect in the female permanent and incurable, preventing
copulation, is a ground of divorce a vinculo. T. G. v. H. G., 476.
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6. Courts of equity sitting in divorce suits must be governed by the principles
of ecclesiastical courts in England. J. G. v. H. G., 476.
7. A voluntary deed of separation is no bar to subsequent application for
divorce. Id.
8. Abandonment to authorize divorce a vinculo matrimonii, must be the
deliberate act of the party complained of. Lynch v. Lynch, 476.
9. Violent and outrageous conduct on the part of the wife will justify a
divorce a mensa et thoro Id.
10. A decree stating that "the allegations of the libel being satisfactorily
proved, a divorce a mensa is decreed," is conclusive between the parties as to
their matrimonial relations to the date of the decree. Slade'v. Slade, 604.
11. The parties are entitled to exceptions to rulings of a judge at nisi
prius, admitting testimony though the libel is tried without a jury. id.
If. Curtcsy and Dower. See BANKRUPTCY, 20.
12. A widow's dower before assignment is a mere right in action. Rayner
v. Lee, 602.
13. ASSIGNMENT or DowER UNDER MISTAKE OF PACT, 610.
III. Separate Estate of wife.
14. A married woman possessed of a separate estate, executing a note
with her husband will be presumed to intend to bind her estate. Kimm v.
Weffert and Wife, 128.
15. Husband cannot recover the value of government bonds deposited with
a bailee and subsequently obtained from him, by the wife on a forged order,
the husband being responsible for the fraud of his wife. Knowing v. Manley,
128.
16. The will of a feme covert professing to dispose of her property, must
be admitted to probate in the same manner as that of any other person.
Schull v. 31urray, 128.
17. By the laws of Maryland a married woman is competent to dispose, by
a will made without her husband's consent, of property settled to her sole and
separate use, if the instrument is silent as to the mode of disposition. Id.
18. Where a wife is possessed of a term of years at the time of marriage,
a subsequent purchase of the reversion by the husband will not extinguish the
term by merger, but it will survive to the wife on her husband's death.. Clark
v. Tenison, 415.
19. A married woman having a separate estate may purchase a boat and
carry on the business of boating, and employ her husband us master. Whedon
v. Champlin, 475.
20. Creditors have no lien on the husband's labor, nor can they force him
to labor for them. Id.
21. If he has acquired property by labor and enhanced his wife's separate
estate, they may follow it. Id.
22. In all such cases the question is one of fraud. Id.
23. On wife's death intestate and without issue the husband is entitled to
her personal property, limited by will to her sole and separate use. Cooney
v. Administrator v. Woodburn, 476.
24. The presumption is that a husband receives his wife's money for her
use, and the burdbn is on him to show the contrary. Young's Estate, 538.
25. The silence of the wife at the time he receives it, is not sufficient to
raise a presumption of a gift to him. Id.
IV. Actions'by and against Husband and Wife.
26. A party lending money secretly to a wife for her use, cannot maintain
an action against the husband for the loan. 1Ranklin v. Foster, 410.
27. A husband cannot even with his wife's consent, maintain an action in
his name, for an injury to his wife's horse. Green v. North Yarmouth, 603.
28. After divorce, a woman may maintain an action against her former'
husband, on a note given during coverture for borrowed money. Webster v.
Webster, 603.
INFANT.
1. Upon an application for sale of an infant's reversionary interest, the
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question is, will the property bring as much now as at the death of the tenant
- -for life. In re Sale of iuifant's Lands, 278.
2. The primary motive of judicial action in regard to the permanent cus-
tody of infants, is the well-being of the infants ; the technical right )f the
parents will not control the decision. The State v. Baird, 348.
3. An infant who has legally avoided a contract for labor, stands precisely
as if it had never been made. Derocher v. Continental Mills, 603.
4. An infant may maintain an action by his mother, on an express contract
after his father's death. Boynton v. Clay, 603.
5. An infant is liable in assumpsit for money stolen. Shao v. Coffln, 604.
INJUNCTION. See CORPORATION, 4; RAILROAD, 5; RIvER, 1; TAXATION,
17 ; TRADE-M.AnK, 3.
1. An injunction which is too broad, will be modified on appeal. Marble
Co. v. Ripley, 199.
2. Where an injunction was modified so as to allow the defendant to remove
certain machinery, upon furnishing a sufficient bond, conditioned to pay the
plaintiff such sum as the court upon final decision might award, it was held
that the obligors upon final decree were not necessarily to pay the entire sum
due from defendant, but only such damages as plaintiff suffered by the
removal. J1foulton Adm'x v. Richardson, 199.
3. In injunction to restrain proceedings at law on a sealed bill, alleging
undue influence in its execution, complainant is entitled to a discovery of the
consideration of the bill. Shortwell's Adm'x v. Struber, 205.
4. Will not be dissolved for new matter in avoidance alleged in the answer
and not responsive to the bill. IJest Jersey Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 343.
5. Equity will restrain a municipal corporation from selling land for taxes
illegally assessed. Leslie v. St. Louis, 602.
6. Equity will not restrain a special tribunal condemning land, manifestly
without authority, so that its judgments are clearly void. Anderson v. St.
Louis, 602.
INSOLVENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
INSURANCE. See ACTION, 4.
1. Where no objection has been made to the form of notice of a loss under
a policy of fire insurance, though not according to the terms of the policy,
all exception is waived. Morks v. Farmers' 1f". F. ins. Co., 68.
2. An assessment of ninety-five per cent. additional to the actual losses in
a certain class, upon the premium notes of a mutual insurance company to
"t meet estimated bad debts, interest, expenses, and costs of collection," is
illegal. York County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowden, 63.
3. A provision in a policy of life insurance that it shall be void if the
assured "shall die by his own hand," includes all kinds of voluntary self-
destruction. If the assured commit suicide, comprehending the physical
nature and consequences of his act and intending to destroy his life, the
policy is void, though he may not have been able to comprehend the moral
nature of the act. Nimick v. Ins. Co., 101.
4. In an action on such a policy, the burden is first on the insurer to show
that the insured died by his own hand ; and this being done, it then rests upon
the plaintiff to prove that the insured was of such insane mind that he did
not commit the act with the knowledge and intent that it should result in
death. Id.
5. Payment of the premium is a condition precedent to the attachment of
the risk, and if the property is destroyed before the premium is paid, the
company are not liable. Bradley v. Potomac Ins. Co., 129.
6. An insurance on a locomotive and car contained in the car-house No. 1,
will not cover a loss occurring while they are not in the car-house. Annapolis
Railroad Co. v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 129.
7. The memoranda upon the margin of a policy are a part of the contract
of insurance. McLaughlin v. Atlantic Ini. Co . 130.
8. The taking posses-ion of a vessel by the United States for the purpose
of sending a cargo to Santiago, is not a capture within the clause of warranty
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against capture from belligerents. Murray Y. Harmony Fire and 3farine
Ins. Co., 279.
9. If the assured, before abandonment, either recovers the subject insured,
or receives an indemnity for its loss, he cannot elect afterwards to abandon.
Id.
10. A policy of insurance containing a clause that if the "title of the pro-
perty is transferred or changed," or " if the policy is assigned," the policy
shall be void, is not avoided by the bankruptcy of the assured and the assign-
ment of his estate to an assignee in bankruptcy, and the assignee may recover
on it in case of a loss. Starkweather v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 333.
11. Where insurance company pays the loss occasioned by the fault of a
railroad, if the assured afterwards recovers damages from the railroad, he
holds them in trust for the insurers. Monmouth Co. v. Hutchinson, 348. -
12. If the railroad company pays the damages, knowing the insured has
received them from the insurers, it is liable to a suit by the insurance com-
pany. and a release by the insured would be no defence. Id.
13. In a valued policy, every shipment is a distinct insurance, to be deter-
mined by the endorsement made ap the time of application as to its terms.
Schaefer v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 410.
14. Words are to be construed in a maritime policy in their ordinary and
popular sense, unless by the usage of trade they have a different meaning.
Cobb v. Lime Rock Ins. Co., 604.
15. The construction of particular words in Boston will not affect a policy
upon a vessel made at Rockland, laine. Id.
16. In a suit by the receiver of an insurance company, to recover assess-
ments on a premium-note, a transcript of the appointmentneed not accom-
pany the complaint. Bolandv. Whitman, 666.
17. By agreement between the insured and the directors of a mutual
insurance company-, the risk may be terminated before the time mentioned in
the policy. Id.
18. It is no defence to a suit on a premium-note, that assessments are
made more frequently than was represented. Id.
19. Fraudulent representations as to the solvency of a company, made at
the time a note was given, is a defence. Id.
20. The insured is not liable to be assessed on his note, for losses occurring
to property after he has sold and conveyed it. Id.
21. THE LIABILITY or LIPE INsuRANcE CO3PANIES IN CASES OP
SUIcIDE, 673.
22. One Moore was the general agent of the United Life, Fire, and Marine
Insurance Company, and of the Kenton Insurance Company, in Louisville.
On the 15th of November 1867, S. & 0. obtained, through him, a policy of
insurance on stock and fixtures from the former company; and on the day
following they obtained, also through him, a policy of insurance of the same
property from the latter company. A considerable portion of the goods was
lost. The first policy contained, inter alia, the following clauses: "If there
is or hereafter shall be made any further insurance on the property hereby
insured, or any part thereof, without being notified to this company, and its
consent thereto written hereon, then and in that case this policy shall be of
no binding force on this company." "No agent of this company has power
to change or modify the terms, conditions, and requirements of this policy
* * *- without express written authority from the principal office at Coving-
ton," Moore had at the dates named no such written authority; and the con-
sent of the insurers to the second insurance was not written on the policy
as required; nor was it directly or indirectly solicited; nor was formal notice
given to any of the company's officers or agents, either of the application for,
or the procuring of, the second insurance. Van Dories v. United Life Ins.
Co., 680.
23. Held: (1). That the United Life, Fire, and Marine Insurance Com-
pany had, through Moore, constructive, if not actual, notice of the double
insurance ; that by the second insurance the first policy was not rendered
absolutely void, but only voidable at the option of the company; and that
good ronse'ence required that it should cancel the policy (by returning a
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proper proportion of the premiums paid), within a reagonable time if a for-
feiture was t6 be insisted on. Van Bories v. United Life Ins. Co., 680.
24. (2). That it was Moore's duty, when be obtained the second insurance
for 0. & S., to notify them that a compliance with their request might work
a forfeiture of the policy he had issued to them the day before, unless they
obtained the consent of the first company in the manner prescribed ; that
although they might be assumed to have known this themselves from their
policy, every principle of fair and open dealing demanded that he should call
their attention to it ; and that his inaction under the circumstances was cal-
culated to mislead and deceivo them. Id.
25. (3). That 0. & S. had the right to expect that, if the company disap-
proved of the conduct of its trusted agent in granting them the second
insurance, it would take steps to cancel the policy, or at least, notify them
of such disapproval ; that, because the company did not cancel the policy,
and because, in the ahsence of such notification, the assured were permitted
to rely upon the validity of the same until after the fire, the former had
waived the'forfeiture, and were estopped fro m setting it up. And it was not
an answer to these positions to say, what was the.fact, that the company had
actually no notice whatever in the premises, since notice to their general
agent was notice to them, and accordingly, his conduct and default were
theirs. Id.
26. (4). That the clause limiting the power of the agent to change or modify
the contract did not affect the conclusion, lt. Because it was not pretended
that Moore attempted so to do; and, 2d. Because the estoppel which pre-
vented the company's escaping its liability on the policy, did not depend
upon whether or not any such change or modification had been made. Id.
27. (5). That for these reasons the company was liable for the insurance. Id.
28. Where the insured in a policy issued by a mutual insurance company
is discharged by a bankrupt or insolvent law from all his debts and contracts,
and among them his premium-note, the consideration for the policy fails, and
the company is not liable to make good a subsequent loss. Reynolds v. In-
surance Co., 715.
29. The receipt by the company of interest upon his premium-note, after
the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, but without actual notice thereof, is
not a waiver of its right to treat the policy as at an end. Id.
30. Where a condition in a policy is, that notice of a fire should be given
to the "secretary forthwith," it will be a compliance, if the insured calls
with the agent the morning after a fire on the premises, and the next day his
statement is sent to the secretary. Beatty v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 745.
31. A condition requiring " a particular account of a loss," is not com
plied with, by a notice of "household furniture $367, groceries $233," the
same as in the policy. 1d.
32. To constitute a waiver of notice, there must be some official act, mere
silence is not enough. Id.
33. Where it is agreed in a policy that the aggregate amount insured in
this and other companies shall not exceed two-thirds of the estimated cash
value, it is taken to mean the value at the time of the insurance. Elliott v.
Lycoming Ins. Co., 745.
34. After receiving notice of over-insurance if a company makes and col-
lects assessments it is estopped from setting up a forfeiture. Id.
35. Where an insurance is on a house and stable and an over-insurance is
made on the house, and both are burned, the company tendering payment for
the stable, are not estopped from setting up; a forfeiture as to the house. Id.
36. A marine policy excepting loss fron bursting of boilers, but covering
those occurring subsequent to and in consequence thereof, does not cover a
loss of a vessel, where the bursting tore out the side of the vessel so that she
sank in five or ten minutes. Evans v. Colhmbian Ins. Co., 798.
37. Owners of goods insured against perils of the seas, "free of particular
average," may recover as for a total loss, if there is an abandonment, though
some of the goods are brought into port. Wallerstein v. Columbian Ins. Co.,
798.
INDEX. , 833
INTEREST. See ATTACUBMENT, 3 ; BILLS AND NOTES, 21, 22; COMPORATION,
11; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 3, 5; UsuRy, 4.
1. Interest is allowable on the whole of a judgment even where costs are
included in it. IVetherill v. Stillman, 537.
2. The interest law of Indiana of 1867, authorizing ten. per cent., governs
contracts made before the law took effect. .Pattison v. Jenkins, 667.
JOINT LIABILITY.
1. To maintain assumpsit for goods sold and delivered against two defend-
ants, plaintiff must show a joint promise. Fuller v. Miller, 130.
2. In an action against two persons on a special agreement, plaintiff can-
not recover unless he avers and proves a joint undertaking. Lee v. Belles,
413.
JOINT TENANT.
I. An estate made to husband and wife during coverture, does not co n~ti-
tute a joint tenancy or tenancy in common, both are seised of the entirety.
McCurdy v. Canning, 347.
2. Neither can dispose of any part without the other's consent. Id.
3. A purchaser at sheriff's sale under judgment against the husband, can-
not recover possession during the wife's life. Id.
JUDGMENT. See INTEREST, 1.
I. Where there is a valid writ and levy, the judgment of a court in attach-
ment suits, cannot be held void collaterally in other suits. Cooper v. Rey-
olds, 62.
2. In favor of or against a dead man is not a nullity. Carr v. Townsend's
Executors, 201.
3. In a scire facias on a judgment, the defendant cannot go behind the orf-
ginal judgment. Id.
4. The judgment of a court of another state, if properly authenticated, has
the same conclusiveness in a foreign state as at home. lVetherill v. Stillman,
536.
5. A judgment insufficiently authenticated cannot be read in evidence. Id.
6. A judgment obtained by wilful perjury may be vacated. Laithe v.
McDonald, 538.
7. An erroneous judgment or execution is not void. - Wilkinton's Appeal,
538.
8. No one but the defendant can take advantage of an irregular execu-
tion. Id.
9. A judgment by default on a service of a summons on the return-day is
not void. Armstrong v. Grant, 604.
10. A judgment in favor of a trustee, in an action by the principal defend-
ant in another action previously begun by trustee process, is 'not conclusive
upon the question of trustee's discharge. Webster v. Adams, 604.
11. An auditor cannot declare a judgment on an amicable scire facias void
and no lien, for want of a stamp. Edwards's Appeal, 746.
12. An irregular judgment may be reversed on error but is good until then,
and an auditor cannot disregard it. Id.
13. A confession of judgment "by defendants" in a suit against two,
where only one is served, is valid. Hatch v. Stitt, 799.
JUROR. See CORPORATION, 6.
1. The expression of the opinion that the defendants "ought to have
received the votes of all registered persons," does not disqualify one as a
juror in an action against such defendants, as judges of an election, for re-
fusing a vote. Elbin v. Wilson, 407.
2. A grand juror cannot be required to state what efforts he made to pro-
cure an indictment, what opinions were expressed, or what was the action of
any juror. .d.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
The granting of an appeal by a justice is a judicial act, and he is not
liable for refusing. Jordan v. Hanson, 201.
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ILANDLORD AND TENANT. -See Ef'rOPrEL, 5 ; TITLE, 7.
1. Attornment is unnecessary in Pennsylvania. Tilford v. Fleming, 410.
2. An alienee may proceed in his own name to recover possession of pre-
mises let by his alienor. .d.
3. An executed lease of laud is inoperative if the lessor's wife refuses to
acknowledge it, and it may be destroyed by the lessor or refused by the lessee.
Tatham v. Lewis, 539.
4. An attachment on order of court of tenant's goods is not an execution
within the meaning of the statute of 8 Anne, ch. 14, sect. 1, but landlord is
entitled to his rent out of the proceeds of the sale. Twmson v. Baltimore
Steam Co., 539.
5. A tenancy under a written lease may be proved by parol. Raynor v.
Lee, 605.
6. Where the lessee under a lease for the term of one year, with the option
-three, continues in possession after the first year, he elects to hold for the full
term. Delashman v. Berry, 667.
7, The Act of December 14th 1863 of Pennsylvania is a complete system
for obtaining possession by a landlord. Brown's Appeal, 797.
LEGACY.
A gift of the interest of a sum during life, and.at the death of tenant for
life, of the principal to another, is a vested legacy in the latter. Thomas's
Ex'rs. v. Anderson's Ez'rs., 349.
LEGAL TENDERS.
THE LEGAL TENDER DEcIsIoNs, 73.
LICENSE. See ACTION, 6.
LIEN. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20; SNIPPING, 7; VENDOR AND PuR-
CHASER, 4.
A judgment-creditor who advances money on the faith of an unencumbered
title by the record, and without notice, has priority of lien to the vendor for
unpaid purchase-money. Hulett v. Whipple, 349.
LIMITATIONS. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 21; MORTGAGE, 14.
1. The operation of the Statute of Limitations by a cause not mentioned
in the statute, will not be prevented for a longer time than such suspension
is an enforced one. Braun v. Saurwein, 69.
2. Mutual accounts to save the running of the statute, must be open and
current, and show a reciprocity of dealing. Webster v. Byrnes, 130.
3. A defence complete under the Statute of Limitations cannot be taken
away by statute, ordinance, or constitutional amendment. Girdner v. Heis-
kell, 201.
4. A suit to recover for the death of a person under section 784 of the
Code of Indiana must be commenced within two years. Hanna v. Jefferson-
ville R. Co., 201.
5. An agreement not to plead the statute, cannot be given in evidence,
upon a replication to a plea that there was.no promise within six years.
Cowart v. Perrine, 202.
6. The promise should be alleged in the bill, and if omitted byinadvertence,
the complainant may amend. Id.
7. The statute is a good plea to a bill for account of trust funds, where the
trust arises only by implication. McClane's Adm'x v. Shepherd's Ex., 279.
8. A payment on account of an existing debt is an unequivocal acknowl-
edgment pnd will take it out of the Statute of Limitations. Barclay's Appeal,
349.
9. The statutes of limitations of the state of Georgia passed during the
war, however defective they may have been in point of original authority,
were ratified by the Constitution of 1868, and are valid. Davis v. Hatcher,
519.
10. The death of a creditor does not suspend the running of the statute.
Green Adm'x v. Goble, 539.
11. The acknowledgment must be in writing to take a claim out of the
statute. Id.
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12. The effect of evidence of continuous possession as the basis of a claim
of title, is not diminished by proof of occasional interruptions. Raynor v.
Lee, 604.
13. Where a sheriff's vendee refuses to comply with a sale, and the land
is subsequently sold, the statute begins to run from the time of refusal.
1Abnk v. Smith, 749.
14. The failure to pay was the breach from which the cause of action
arose, the promise to pay being the bid. Id.
15. In an action against an attorney for neglect to collect, the statute be-
gins to run from the time the attorney first became liable. RIines's Adm'rs
v. Evans, 794.
16. Suit for neglect in not commencing proceedings, was brought against
an attorney seven years and five months after a note had been placed in his
hands for collection. Held, as matter of law, that the statute was a bar. Id.
17. The statute runs against a county or other municipal corporation.
"Nulum tempus occurrit reipublicz, applies to the sovereign only. Evans v.
Erie, 799.
LIS PENDENS.
1. Purchser of land during suit takes subject to plaintiff's rights.
Haughwout v. Mturphij, 202.
2. Lis petidens only takes effect from service of the subpeena. Id.
3. A subsequent purchaser of land is only protected as to money actually
paid before notice. Id.
MANDAMUS.
1. Will lie to reinstate a city attorney, wrongfully removed from office.
City of Madison v. Korbly, 70.
2. The writ cannot be properly granted to one who has previously institu-
ted proceedings in equity for the same cause of complaint. Hardcastle v.
Maryland R. Co., 130.
3. Will lie by a volunteer to compel the officers of a town to pay a bounty-
People ex rel. Vanderlin v. Martin, 411.
4. Will not lie where a statute has provided an adequate remedy at law.
State ex rd. Wheeler v. McAuliff, 605.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIxFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. An agreement to pay an agent "$3000 in equal quarterly payments,"
creates a hiring for a year. Kirk v. Hartman, 69.
2. One hired for no definite time, is a hiring at the will of both parties,
and the servant may be discharged without notice. Id. ,
3. Debt will lie on a contract for service for a determinate time and fixed
compensation, when the servant is dismissed before its expiration. Id.
4. A railroad employee having knowledge of the unfitness of a co-em-
ployee, and who does not give notice to his employer, takes the risk of
injury from such unfitness. Davis v. D. and M. Railroad Co., 477.
5. Where employer and employee have equal knowledge, and the latter
continues the service, each party takes the risk, unless the employer gives
special directions. Id.
6. Principal is liable for his servant's incompetency or negligence, and
also for his careless performance of his employment. Lannen v. Albany Gas
Co., 799.
MISNOMER.
Misnomer of one of the partners is unimportant, if the name of the firm
is correct. Rushton v. Rowe, 344.
MONEY. See CONFLICT OF LAws, 2.
MORTGAGE. See ACTION, 1; ATTACHMENT, 2; CONFEDERATE STATES, 3;
CORPORATION, 13.; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 8, 10; FRAUDS OF STATUTE,
8; PA.RTNEnsHIP, 11 ; SHIPPING, 3.
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1. Parties having a substantial interest in the property are entitled to be
made defendants in a suit to foreclose. Bates v. Hfiller, 69.
2. A mortgagee could not foreclose his mortgage by proceedings in a
court within the Union lines during the rebellion, when the mortgagor was
within the Confederate lines. A notice to the mortgagor by publication in a
newspaper was not a legal notice, and proceedings founded thereon were
wholly void. Dean v. Nelson, 221.
3. A mortgage made for future advances is good against a subsequent pur-
chaser or mortgagee. Farnum v.Burnett, 203.
4. An instrument under seal is good, though no consideration was given for
it. .d.
5. A mortgagee who has been paid, is liable to a penalty for refusal to enter
satisfaction on the record. Verges v. Gibon1 , 203.
6. The failure of a mortgagee to keep his covenants is no defence to a
suit for foreclosure. Coursen v. Canfield, 279.
7. A bondfide purchaser for valuable consideration holds subject to every
equity and defence to which the mortgage is subject in the hands of the mort-
gagee. Id.
8. The purchase of a mortgage by thO executors of the mortgagor, where
a third party owns the premises, does not satisfy it. Stillman's Ex'rs v. Still-
man, 349.
9. A mortgagor who has sold land subject to the mortgage as part of the
consideration, is entitled to be subrogated to the mortgage, and repaid what
he has paid on his own bond, if he is the donee of the mortgage. Id.
10. Where land subject to a mortgage is conveyed in two parcels, and the
parcel last conveyed is released, the other parcel must pay such proportion
of the mortgage as its value bore to the whole tract at the time of the con-
veyance of such parcel. Id.
11. A deed absolute on its face, but given as seeurity for the payment of
money, is a mortgage, and subject to redemption. Crane Y. Decamp, 351.
12. A mortgage will pass all structures or fix.tures that may be afterwards
erected on the land by the mortgagor. P. II'. and B. Railroad v. I'odepper,
411.
13. Whenever there is an advance of money to be returned within a speci-
fied time upon the security of an absolute conveyance, it is a mortgage what-
ever the form adopted or the understanding of the parties. Harper's Appeal,
411.
14. The Statute of Limitations is no bar to a reconveyance in such a case.
Id.
15. The mortgagee in possession will be allowed for reasonable improve-
ments. Id.
16. A mortgage of property "to be thereafter acquired," is good and
binding. P. W. 4- B. Railroad v. Woelpper, 411.
17. One may grant the future accretions of any subject he owns at the
time of the grant. Id.
18. Equity will treat a mortgage of property, whether real or personal, to
be subsequently acquired, as a binding contract. Id.
19. A mortgage of real estate is valid without attestation. Carrico v.
Farmers' Bank, 414.
20. A chattel mortgage can be avoided for usury by a judgment-creditor
of the mortgagor. Carow v. Kelly, 600.
21. Under the laws of 1859 of Maine, the mortgagee of personal property
could not commence an action against the officer attaching such property
until he had given him forty-eight hours' notice. Nichols v. Perry, 605.
22. The fact that the officer knew of the mortgage does not excuse want
of notice. Id.
23. By the statute of Colorado a mortgage is not assignable so as to cut
out any defence of the mortgagor, and the fact that it was given as security
for a negotiable note does not alter its character in that respect. Longen v.
Carpenter, 650.
24. The assignment of a negotiable note secured by mortgage carries the
mortgage with it as an incident, but this is so only in equity, and if the
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assignee comes into equity to foreclose the mortgage he will be made to do
equity in regard to any defence the mortgagor may have against the original
mortgagee. Lougen v. Carpenter, 650.
25. A promissory note though secured by mortgage is still negotiable, and
when a holder for value who took in good faith before maturity sues on the
note at law he will be entitled to judgment for the full amount of the note ;
but if he goes into equity to foreclose the mortgage the court will let in any
defence that would have been good against the mortgagee himself. Id.
26. A. made a promissory note to B. and secured it by a mortgage, and
also by a quantity of wheat delivered to B. to be sold and the proceeds applied
in payment of the note. B. sold a portion of the wheat but did not apply the
proceeds to A.'s credit, and subsequently assigned the note and mortgage to
C. On a bill in equity by C. to foreclose the mortgage, it was held that A.
could recoup the value of the wheat sold by B. before the assignment. Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See LIMITATIONS, 17; Rtn , 4.
. 1. A municipal corporation created by legislative act i not dissolved by its
failure to elect officers. Welch v. St. Genevieve, 512.
2. In this country, officers do not, in the sense of the English books, con-
stitute an integral part of the corporation, but they are the mere agents or
servants of the corporate body. Id.
3. Municipal corporations cannot be dissolved by the courts for non-user
or misuser of their powers or franchises. .d.
4. Where a judgment existed against a municipal corporation, having no
property subject to sale, and whose duty it was to levy and collect a special
tax to pay the judgment, and where the corporation was without officers, and
would not, though having the power, supply itself with officers, the court
appointed its marshal to assess, levy, and collect the requisite tax; but sus-
pended the order so as to allow the corporation to reorganize and itself to
collect the tax. Id.
5. The Ousting Ordinance passed by the Constitutional Convention of
Missouri and the General Town Incorporation Act of that state, construed
and applied. id.
6. Bonds issued by a municipal corporation though not authorized by an
existing statute, become binding if they are subsequently ratified by the legis-
lature. Steines v. Franklin Co., 746.
NEGLIGENCE. See CoMmoN CARRIER, 9, 13, 17 ; RAILROAD, 14.
1. It is negligence on the part of a railroad not to furnish comfortable
sitting room for all of its passengers unless the train is unexpectedly crowded
by a large party going a few miles. Quinn v. .llinois C. Railroad, 132.
2. It is negligence on the part of a passenger to stand on the platforms if
there is standing room in the cars. .d.
3. A city railroad company will be liable for an injury occurring at a
street crossing, resulting from the work having been done in an unskilful
and improper manner, although such work meet the approval of Q. city in-
spector, appointed by an ordinance to oversee such work. Delzell v. Ind. and
Cin. Railroad Co., 204.
4. An owner of a wreck sunk in navigable waters is not liable for injuries
to navigators. 11inpenny v. Philadelphia, 540.
5. The negligence of the party relying on false representations is no
answer to an action for damages resulting therefrom. Eaton v. Winnie, 540.
6. The owner of a tow-boat on a river, is not responsible for injury to one
of the tow, without proof of negligence or want of skill. Taft v. Carter,
540.
7. When the facts are agreed, what constitutes negligence is a question of
law. Kansas Pacific Railroad v. Butts, 668.
8. It is not negligence per se to permit standing grass and weeds on a rail-
way track. Id.
9. In an action for negligence if the plaintiff makes out a primdfacie case,
the burden is on the defendant to disprove care. Penna. Canal Co. v.
Bentley, 746.
10. If the plaintiff's case discloses contributory negligence he cannot
recover. Id.
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NEW TRIAL.
1. The court will order a new trial where the amount of damages shows
.that the jury were influenced by passion and prejudice. Union Pacific Rail-
roadev. Hand, 478.
2. As a general rule, where improper evidence has been received after
objection, the party prejudiced by it has a right to a new trial. Kay v.
Thompson, 594.
3. Where defendant died after verdict, and pending a motion for a new
trial on his behalf, the ordering the new triaLwas suspended to enable the
plaintiff to apply to the court to impose terms on making the rule absolute.
Id.
4. To entitle the defendant to a new trial on the ground that the plaintiff
has not proved his case, it must appear that the cause is unproved in its entire
scope. Updike v. Abel, 147.
NUISANCE.
The question of nuisance must be determined by general and fixed laws.
Yates v. Milwaukee, 207.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See AGENT, 9; ELECTION, 2; QUO WAERANTO,
4 ; TAXATION, 19.
1. A person legally entitled to an office, may demand the office, and cannot
be restricted to compensation. City of Madison Y. Korbley, 70.
2. Title to an office is derived from election or appointment. A commis-
sion is merely evidence of title. Hunter v. Chandler, 440.
3. An action for money had and received 7ill lie in favor of a person
legally entitled or in possession of an office, against one who has usurped or
intruded into it, for the recovery of the fees received by the intruder ; but
where a party claiming the title has not been in actual possession, and his
claim is disputed, he must first establish his title by some appropriate legal
proceeding. The title to an office cannot be determined in an action for
fees. Id.
4. The official acts of an officer defacto are valid while he is in possession.
Board of Auditors v. Benoit, 541.
5% No claim can be enforced against a county for a salary except for the
period the claimant was incumbent. Id.
PARTNERSHIP. Sea AsSUMPST, 8.
1. In a suit against two as partners on contract, the question would be
whether they were partners in that contract. Kirk v. Hartman, 70.
2. Where one partner has had entire charge of the business, he is to be
debited with the whole capital, as well as the proceeds of sales made by him.
Gunnell v. Bird, 70.
3. One partner cannot become the owner of the partnership property with-
out the consent of the others. Comstock v. Buchanan, 131.
4. Nor can one partner sell the property to himself, though he may to third
parties. .d.
5. Equity will enjoin one partner from violating the rights of his copartner.
Marble Co. v. Ripley, 204.
6. Declarations of one partner admissible to prove partnership. Bennett
v. Holmes, 204.
7. CRITERIA OP PARTNERsuIr, 209.
8. In a question as to E. being a partner, H. of the firm of H. & F. testi-
fied to J. being a partner, and that E. asked for the books and said he had
as much interest as J. Held, that the books of H. & F. were admissible.
Frick- v. Barbour, 407.
9. To entitle the holder to recover against the partners, on a note made
by a member of the firm he must prove either that the money was borrowed
on the credit of the partnership, or that it was used in the business of the
firm. National Bank v. Inqraham, 412.
10. If the money was loaned on the individual credit of the maker of the
note, the using of the money by the firm would not render the firm liable. Id.
11. The mortgagee of an undivided half of real estate, owned by a part-
nership but mortgaged by a member of the firm for his debt, cannot foreclose
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as against the sheriff's vendee of the land, sold under a judgment against
the firm for a debt contracted before the execution of the mortgage. Eistner
v. Sindlinger, 667.
12. Under the code of Indiana a partner can sue his partner. Page v.
Thompson, 667.
13. Where attorneys as partners, recover a judgment, and after dissolution
one collects and fails to pay it over, the other is liable to an action for the
money. Bryant v. Hawkins, 746.
PARTITION.
1. The surrender of the entire interest of a sister in real estate descended
to her and others, for a gross sum, constitutes a sale. Thomas v. Farmers'
Bank, 131.
2. The claim of a parcener who has surrendered her interest for a sum in
gross, bears no resemblance to a charge for owelty of partition. Id.
3. A court of equity will not interfere with proceedings in partition begun
at law, unless necessary to protect a party from fraud. Hall v. Piddock, 349.
4. A tenant in common who has made improvements on the land is entitled
to an equitable partition. Id.
5. It is no bar that such improvements were made by the tenants in rever-
sion during the life estate. Id.
6. The report of a referee, not in accordance with the decree in partition,
is erroneous and mast be set aside. Hobart v. Hobart, 412.
7. Where the rights of parties in partition have been adjudged by'the
decree to be different from what they are in law, the decree must be reversed. Id.
8. Advancements made to a child during parents' lifetime must be pro-
vided for in the decree. id.
PASSENGER. See RAILROAD, 2, 13:
PAYMENT. See AGREEMENT, 2; BILLS AND NOTES, 13; CONFEDERATE
STATES, 6, 18; CUSTOMS, 1; PRACTICE, 8; TAXATION, 12.
I. Appropriation of payments made by mutual assent cannot be revoked
without such assent. Plummer v. Erskine, 541.
2. Where a bank pays a debt of one of its depositors, and takes his note under
an agreement that the balance in bank shall be applied in repayment, it is an
appropriation, and the balances may be deducted in a suit by a receiver of
the bank, on the note. Chase v. Petroleum Bank, 794.
3. One attempting to defraud another by payment cannot ask repayment
from him attempted to be defrauded. Bleakley's Appeal, 797.
PLEADING. See RELEASE; TENDER.
1. In trespass quare clausum fregit, "C not guilty" puts the plaintiff's pos-
session in issue. McCausland Y. Fleming, 63.
2. In a suit on a promissory note it is sufficient to allege that the defend-
ant executed the notes ; the question of authority is one of evidence and not
of pleading. Slivin v. Rippey, 70.
3. The non-joinder of a party in actions ex delicto can only be taken
advantage of by plea in abatement. Cooper v. Grand Trunk Railroad, 204.
4. A petition stating sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, is suffi-
cient. Fitzpatrick v. Gebhart, 541.
5. Amendments of pleadings maybe in three ways: 1st. By interlineation;
2. By writing on separate paper; 3. By re-writing the original pleading. Id.
6. An objection to a petition for insufficiency is only good when there is a
total failure to allege some matter essential to the relief sought. Laithe v.
McDonald, 542.
7. Under the common count of goods, wares, and merchandise sold and
delivered, evidence of the sale of oxen is admissible. [Feston v. McDowell,
605.
8. A plea in abatement must be direct and positive. Severy v. Nye, 667.
9. The pendency of an action of trespass against a deputy, for wrongful
acts, cannot be pleaded in abatement in an action against the sheriff for the
same cause. Id.
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10. Nor is the pendency of such suit against the deputy a release of the
latter action. &very v. Nye, 667.
11. A complaint for damages for fraudulent representations in the sale of
real estate, must contain an averment that vendee relied upon such represen-
tations. Goings v. WMite, 671.
12. A suit brought by an insurance company in its name, on a note made
to N. B., "agent of the company," is properly brought. Black v. Enterprise
Ins. Co., 746.
13. An answer to a suit on a note, alleging that the plaintiff is a foreign
insurance company, but failing to show a non-compliance with the require-
ments of the Act of December 21st 1865 of Indiana, is bad on demurrer. Id.
14. An answer to a suit on a note alleging that it was given to a third
person for goods bought by the de'endant and was only made payable to the
plaintiff that he might collect it as agent, and for no other purpose, is bad,
because it does not allege that plaintiff was not the owner. Waddle v. Har-
beck, 747.
POWERS. See WILL, 9.
1. The intention of thle donee of a power is the criterion to! determine its
execution. .Bingham's Appeal, 413.
2. The subject of a power is the property of the donor not of the donee in
whom it is only a trust. d.
3. The law of the sittus of the subject of the power controls its execution. Id.
PRACTICE. See ADMI AvLT, 1, 3, 6; INUsuRNCE, 16 ; JUDGMENT, 9; NEw
TRIAL, 3.
1. A verdict for "all land lying in C. county down to the line established
by G. and V. in 1849," the said line being the public recorded boundary line
of a county, is sufficiently certain. Smith v. Brotherline, 50.
2. The assignee of an account must sue in his own name as plaintiff. Long
v. Heinrich, 192.
3. A court having once stated the law correctly in its charge, it is not
error to refuse a restatement. Gillet v- Corum, 402.
4. A plaintiff may join in one action as defendants the maker and guar-
antor of a note. Hendrix v. Fuller, 403.
5. A statement of the facts of a case by a judge of the Superior Court for
the purpose of reserving the case for the advice of the Supreme Court, is not
a part of the record in the case. Lord v. Litchfield, 493.
6. Where both parties to a suit- move for a new trial or file motions in
error, the party should go forward in the argument whose right it was to go
forward in the court below. Sellew's Appeal, 7Q8.
7. A judge is not bound to submit a mere spark of evidence. Elliott v.
Lycoming Ins. Co., 745.
8. Payment of money into court, where the declaration is on a special
contract, supersedes the necessity of proving it. .d.
9. It is an acknowledgment of the right of action to the amount brought
in, but not beyond. Id.
10. Such payment waives no defence. Id.
11. After payment the defendant may take a defence which goes to the
whole cause of action. Id.
12. After judgment it is too late for the unsuccessful party to object that
the recovery was on grounds not alleged in the complaint. Updike v. Abel,
747.
13. In an action for fraudulent representations of the vendor, the court
charged that if the vendee expressly said he would not purchase lands held
under a tax title, and the vendor sold him a tax title, falsely representing it,
it was a fraud: Held, to be correct. Updyke v. Abel, 750.
14. Where a complainant in chancery amends his bill after answer filed,
the defendant is entitled to be informed of the amendment. either by notice
under rules of court, or by service of process under the amended bill. TM e-
zeik v. .McGraw, 790.
15. After such notice or service the complainant must have a decree that
the amended bill be taken pro confesso for want of an answer before he can
be entitled to a final hearing and decree. Id.
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PROFESSIONAL EThtICS.
1. PROPER LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DUTY, 281.
2. TUE RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF TuE LEGAL PROFESSION, 545.
QUO WARRANTO.
1. Must set forth all the facts which show that the relator is entitled to the
office. State cx rel. Kempf v. Boat, 132.
2. Is tile proper remedy against persons usurping the office of trustees of
a chartered church. Corn. ex rel. Gordon v. Graham, 413.
3. A motion to quash must be for defects in the suggestion itself. id.
4. The judgment on a quo warranto, at the suit of the Attorney-General
acting for the state, settles the title as between the state and the defendant,
but does not fix the rights of another person claiming to be the rightful officer.
Hunter v. Chandler, 440.
5. If proceedings on such quo warranto are commenced during the incum-
bency of defendant, his subsequent death or resignation, or the expiration of
the term of office, will not prevent the information from being prosecuted to
judgment. Id.
RAILROAD. See NEGLIGENCE, 1, 8 ; TAXATION, 8.
1. A common carrier of passengers is responsible for the wilful miscon-
duct of his servant toward a passenger. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway, 17.
2. A passenger who is assaulted and grossly insulted in a railway car by a
brakeman employed on the train, has a remedy therefor against the com-
pany. Id.
3. If a brakeman, employed on a railway passenger train, assault and
grossly insult a passenger thereon, and the company retain the offending
servant in their service after his misconduct is known to them, they will be
liable to exemplary damages. Id.
4. If two railroads have authority to run a railroad between the same
termini, neither can take exception to an irregularity in'the other, unless it
shows particular injury. Erie .. .. v. Del. - L. R. 2., 350.
5. Where a railroad has irregularly appropriated lands of no particular
value to the owner, a court of equity will not enjoin their use by the com-
pany. Id.
6. A railroad company not being in fault as to the quality or character of
its equipments, the special risks incident to property on account of proximity
to the trains, must be borne by those placing themselves in such localities.
M3ichigan Central R. v. Anderson, 477.
7. Railroad companies are required to use the utmost human sagacity and
foresight in the construction of roads, to prevent accidents. Union Pacidic
.R. v. Hand, 478.
8. A defect in the track anywhere, may be shovwn if it contributed to the
injury. Id.
9. A railroad company, like any other common carrier, must serve all
persons alike so far as equally within its power. It is the duty of such com-
pany, therefore, to deliver grain in bulk in the regular course of business to
any elevator along its line, as directed in the consignment. It is no excuse
that the company has made contracts with the owners of certain elevators to
deliver exclusively to them. Railway Co. v. People, 585.
10. But a railroad company cannot be made to deliver beyond its own
line, even though there is a connecting track between its terminus and the
place of consignment, over which it has a right to run its cars on payment
of certain track fees. Id.
11. A railroad corporation contracting to transport a passenger from one
station to another, does not obligate itself to furnish him safe egress and
ingress at an intermediate station. State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 605.
12. A railroad corporation whose track is in a highway may unload its
cars there, if it does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the way for
ordinary travel. Mathews v. Kelsey, 606.
13. If .i person enters the saloon-car of a freight railway train, and, when
the train starts, without being requested or directed to leave, remains there as
a passenger, contrary to the rules of the company, but with the knowledge
of the conductor, who receives from him the usual fare of a first-class pas-
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senger, the corporation incurs the same liability for his safety as if he were
in their regular passenger train. Dunn v. Grand iTrunk R. R., 615.
14. It is negligence in a traveller crossing a railroad not to stop and look
up and down, because he is bound to presume a train is coming. Penna. Ca-
nal Co. v. Bentley, 746.
15. Where a duty is defined, a failure to perform it is negligence, and may
be so declared by the court. Id.
16. Where the property of a landowner is unnecessarily damaged in the
construction or repairing of a railroad by any want of skill, care, or prudence
for his protection, he may recover therefor in an action for damages as at
common law, notwithstanding a statutory method is provided in the charter.
Terre Haute 4 I. R. R. Co. v. McKinley, 748.
REAL ESTATE. See SALE, 3.
An owner of real estate is not without a remedy for injuries done to the
same, under chapter 113 of the Statutes of Kansas, because he is not in pos-
session at the time. Fitzpatrick v. Gebhart, 668.
RECEIVER. See CoRPoRATION, 14, 15.
RECEIPT.
1. Is open to contradiction, explanation, or correction. Russell v. CQurch,
542.
2. A written acknowledgment that the subscriber had received a promissory
note, and that the maker was to have certain shares of stock when issued, is
not a contract for the future sale of the stock, but recognises the shares as
the consideration of the note. Hope Iron Works v. Holden, 668.
RECORD. See ACKNOWLEDGMENT, 6 ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 20 ; TITLE, 10.
1. The failure of a recorder to enter in the index the names of parties to
a deed properly recorded, does not prevent the record being notice to subse-
quent purchasers. Bishop v. Schneider, 132.
2. A purchaser claiming title against a prior deed, as a bond fide purchaser
without notice, must prove want of notice, and payment of the value before
notice. Id.
RELEASE. See SsERiFF, 4 ; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, I.
A plea of release is not void because it fails to allege that it was obtained
without fraud. Mc Clane Adin'x v. Shepherd's Ex., 280.
REPLEVIN.
1. In replevin the verdict need not describe the property more specifically
than the complaint. Anderson v. Lane, 205.
2. The owner of property disposed of, by the person having it in charge,
may bring replevin without previous demand. Ballou v. O'Birien, 669.
RIPARIAN OWNER.
1. The title of a riparian owner on the Allegheny (a navigable stream)
does not include an island opposite his land. Ifainwriglt v. McCullough, 71.
2. The title of a riparian owner between high and low water mark is sub-
ject to the right of navigation and improvement of the stream as a highway.
Id.
3. The title of a riparian owner on the Ohio extends to low-water mark,
subject to the easement in the public of navigation. Martin v. City of
Evansville, 7 1.
4. Log-owners are liable to the riparian owners, for damages caused by
travelling on the banks. Hooper v. Hobson, 72.
5. The state is the absolute owner of the land below high-water mark
under all navigable water within its territorial limits, and such land can be
granted to any one, either public or private, without making compensation to
the owner of the shore. Railroad Co. v. Stevens, 165.
6. By the local custom of the state the shore owner can reclaim the land
between high and low water marks, but such privilege is a mere license which
the legislature may revoke at any time before execution. Id.
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7. The rights conferred by the Wharr Act, are also revocable before
execution by the landowner. Railroad Co. v. Stevens, 165.
8. A statute giving a railroad company the right to lay their road along a
river and to acquire the rights of the shore owners, will not be construed to
give by implication, the right to take the land of the state lying below the
high-water line. Id.
9. A riparian owner on a navigable stream has a right of free access to the
navigable part, and a right to make a landing or wharf for his own use.
Yates v. Milwaukee, 207.
10. Such rights are to be enjoyed, subject to the public right in the river
as a navigable stream. Id.
RIVER. See CoURTs, 1 ; RtPARIAN OwNER, 3, 5, 9 ; TxATioxr, 3.
1. The United States may bring an injunction in the proper Circuit Court
to protect improvements which they are making under the authority of
Congress in navigable waters, from injury, which will be caused by works of
internal improvement within state limits and authorized by state authority.
The power of the Federal Government, when called into exercise, is in such
cases not only paramount but exclusive, and cannot lawfully be interfered
with to any extent. United States v. Duluth, 449.
2. Whether the work prosecuted under state authority will have the effect
to interfere with that prosecuted under the Federal authority, is a question
upon which the opinions of the government engineers, while entitled to great
consideration, are not conclusive. Td.
3. Where the injury threatened is of a character not easily remedied if the
injunction be refused, and there is no denial that the act charged is contem-
plated, a tempoi-ary injunction should be granted unless the case made by the
bill is satisfactorily refuted. Id.
4. A municipal corporation through which a stream passes is not bound to
keep it navigable. 117npenny v. Philadelphia, 540.
5. The obligation of removing obstructions is upon the United States. Id.
ROAD.
Damages assessed for opening a road through land, belong to the owner of
the land at the time the road is opened. Afeginnis v. unamaker, 414.
SALE. See CHtAMPERT; PARTITIo N, 1 ; PLEADING, 11 ; RECEIPT, 2;
STOCK; TAXATION, 18.
1. Actual delivery of possession and specification of price is necessary to
constitute a sale- Bigley v. Risher, 205.
2. Where a purchaser never was in possession, but the sale was concluded
in and evidenced by a bill of sale, it is the best evidence of the fact.
Barnett v. Williams, 407.
3. In making sales of real estate to fix contract liability, the analogy of
sales under legal process will furnish the rule as to the requisite notice.
Eldridge v. Bliss, 478.
SCHOOL. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
SEDUCTION.
In an action for damages for breach of promise to mariv, the jury in estima-
ting, the damages may consider the fact of seduction. Sauer v. Schulenberg,
478.
SET-OFF.
1. The right of set-off is wholly regulated by statute. Robinson v. Safford,
133.
2. A mere liability as endorser, is not allowable as set-off. Id.
3. But money received by plaintiff for his authorized transfer of defend-
ant's stock, is. Id.
4. Also drafts drawn by defendant for accommodation of plaintiff and paid
by the former. Id.
5. Also amount pail by defendant to redeem stock, pledged by plaintiff
under power of attorney, for money loaned by a bank to him. Id.
6. A judgment for costs against a decedent's estate cannot be set off in a
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suit by the administrator against the judgment plaintiff, on a note executed
by the latter to the decedent. Nave v. Tlilson, 743.
7. But a judgment on a claim against the decedent can. Id.
8. In a suit by a trustee, the defendant may set off a debt due him from the
castui que trust. Waddle v. Harbec, 747.
SHERIFF. See PLEADING, 9 ; SURETY, 6 ; TITLE, 9.
1. Mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a sheriff's sale,
nor is it per se proof of fraud. Kloepping v. Stellmacher, 351.
2. Unexecuted paiol agreements to buy in property at sheriff's sale for the
defendants in the execution, can only be sustained on the ground of fraud.
Merritt v. Brown, 351.
3. A sheriff may be amerced for official misconduct after his term has
expired. Armstrong v. Grant, 669.
4. After the liability of a sheriff has become fixed by the neglect of his
deputy, a mere agreement by the plaintiff not to commence proceedings
against the deputy until the maturity of certain notes, will not operate as a
release of thi sheriff's liability. McKinley v. Tucker, 669.
SHIPPING.
1. A vessel employed on the lakes, between a port of the United States
and a foreign port, having shipped a seaman on verbal promise of certain
wages, and no shipping aKticles having been signed, the seaman may leave
the vessel at any time. If the seaman has drawn the full wages promised,
and does not demand more before leaving, he cannot recover a larger amount.
The Propeller Fremont, 340.
2. The owners of a ship are responsible for supplies furnished on the cap-
tain's order, though in a home port. W~insor v. Maddock, 413.
3. The assignee of a mortgage of a vessel takes it with all the powers and
rights possessed by the mortgagee. Dalrymple v. Sheehan, 478.
4. The master of a vessel is responsible for the necessary supplies, and the
interest of the owners in the freight is superior to the master's or his creditors',
and therefore is not subject to attachment for supplies. Stirling v. Loud, 542.
5. Whenever there is a risk of collision it is the duty of a steamer to keep
out of the way of a sailing vessel. P. V. 4-. B. Railroad v. Kerr, 543.
6. There may be dangers and difficulties which will excuse a violation of
the rule, but a jury must then determine. Id.
7. The writ for enforcing a laborer's lien on a vessel, under the laws of
Maine of 1858, . 15, need not allege whether the labor was done before or
after she was launched. McCabe v. McRae, 671.
8. The lien attaches, notwithstanding the labor was performed for one who
contracted with the owner. Id.
9. If the claimant would avoid the lien, he must show that the laborer has
knowingly surrendered or waived it. Id.
10. A person claiming a lien, for labor on a vessel, is required to state in
his specification, the name of the owner only when he knows it. Id.
11. It is no defence, to an action for enforcing a lien on a vessel after she
is launched, that the officer making the attachment took a receiptor. Id.
12. Where, in an action to enforce a lien upon a vessel, brought by a
laborer against one who contracted with the owner, the defendant is defaulted,
such default is not evidence against the claimant as to the amount of the
lien on the vessel. .d.
SLANDER.
1. Proof of a repetition of the original charge is allowed, for the purpose
of showing the degree of malice with which the slander was uttered. Johnson
v. Brown, 71.
2. It is not error for the judge to charge in an action of slander, that if
the words were spoken with the qualification, 11 if reports were trite," that
will not change the actionable nature of the words. Id.
3. It is not necessary that all the words laid in the declaration should be
actionable in slander. Klumph v. Dunn, 749.
4. All the words spoken at the time may be given in evidence as showing
the animus. Id.
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5. To render words actionable per se they must impute an offence of moral
turpitude punishable criminally. Klumph v. Dunn, 749.
6. The law as to the offence in the country in which the words are spoken
is to determine their character. Id.
7. The position and family of the plaintiff bear on the question of dam-
ages, and are admissible in evidence. Id.
SLAVE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1; CONFEDERATE STATES, 23.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
1. Equity will enforce the specific performance of an agreement to dispose
of property in a certain way by will, if made upon a sufficient consideration,
or if a failure would work a fraud. Gupton v. Gupton, 135.
2. Specific performance will not be decreed :-
(a). Against one party where the other has disregarded his reciprocal
obligations.
(b). Nor where the duties to be fulfilled by the grantee involve the exer-
cise of skill, personal labor, &c.
(c). Nor where there is want of mutuality.
(d). Nor where the grantor has a complete remedy at law. Marble Co.
v. Ripley, 199.
3. A delay of two and a half years not accounted for in bringing suit, is
fatal to relief. Haughwout v. Murphy, 202.
4. A party who seeks specific performance must be prompt in asking the
aid of the courts. Aerritt v. Brown, 351.
5. He must show that he has performed or been ready and willing to per-
form all the essential terms of his contract. Crane v. Decamp, 351.
6. The court must be satisfied that the claim is fair, reasonable, just, and
equal. Id.
7. Though the granting of specific performance is a matter of discretion,
yet it does not rest in the mere caprice of the judge. Foot v. Webb, 478.
8. Equity will not make a decree for specific performance with compensa-
tion, where the adjustment of the dompensation would be extremely difficult.
Phillips v. Stauch, 666.
STAMP. See JUDGMENT, 11.
1. The omission to stamp a deed must be with intent to evade the statute,
in order to make an objection to it available. Cagger v. Lenning, 133.
2. The fraudulent omissioft to stamp a note under the Act of July 13th
1866, cannot be taken advantage of on demurrer. Campbells v. Wilcox, 205.
3. United States stamps are not essential to the validity of a deed, nor to
its admissibility in evidence in a state court. Sporrer v. Eifler, 206.
4. An instrument made within the Confederate lines is not void for want
of a stamp. Susong v. Williams, 206.
5. U.NSTAmPED INSTRUMENTS, 481.
STATUTES. See RIPARIAN OWNER, 8; UsURm, 4.
1. In the construction of statutes the meaning of the legislature is the end
to be sought, but such construction should not be repugnant to the clear
meaning of the words. Township of Leoni v. Taylor, 537.
2. A law will be construed to have a prospective operation only, unless a
contrary intent plainly appears. Smith v. Hu pmhrey, 670.
STOCK. See AGENT, 7 ; BRoxER, 2.
The rule of caveat emptor applies as well to the sale of stocks as of other
chattels, the vendor is only liable for misrepresentation or fraud. Renton v.
Aaryott, 280.
STREET. See CONDITION, 2; EASEMENT.
The lurchaser of a lot calling to bound on a street not yet opened, is enti-
tled to a right of way over it until it reaches some other street. Hawley v.
31ayor of Baltinore, 538.
SUBROGATION.
Is of pure equity and benevolence, and not of contract. Bleakley's Ap-
peal, 797.
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1. A surety is bound with his principal as an original promissor, and his
obligation to pay is equally absolute ; he is held ordinarily to know every
.default of his principal, and cannot protect himself by the mere indulgence
of the creditor or by the want of notice of the default of the principal, how-
ever much such indulgence or want of notice may, in fact, injure him.
McMillan v. Bull's Head Bank, 431.
2. The contract of a guarantor is his own separate contract. He is not
bound to do what the principal has contracted to do, like a surety, but only to
answer for the consequences of the default of the principal. He is not bound
to take notice of the non-performance of the original contract of the princi-
pal, and the creditor should give him notice ; and if the guarantor can prove
that he has suffered damage by the failure to give such notice, he will be dis-
charged to the extent of the damage thus sustained. He cannot be sued with
his principal. One contracting jointly with the principal debtor is, it seems,
never deemed a guarantor. Id.
3. Query as to the doctrine of notice in cases of guaranty. Id.
4. A surety is discharged where the creditor after notice and request, has
been guilty of a delay which amounts to gross negligence, and by his negli-
gence the surety has lost his security or indemnity.- But the omission of the
creditor to sue a principal residing in another state could not, under any cir-
cumstances, as between him and the surety, make him chiargeable with gross
negligence. Dav'is v. Hatcher, 519.
5. Where a party authorizes another to sign an official bond for him as
surety, provided it is also signed by certain others, and it is never signed
by such others, he will not be bound. Bagot v. State ex rel. Dennison, 749.
6. A sheriff's return to an execution showing the collection of the money,
is conclusive upon his sureties, in a suit for not paying it over. Id.
7. Unreasonable delay or bad faith on the part of a creditor to enforce
securities against the principal, upon request of the sureties, will be a defence
by the latter, to the extent the securities may depreciate. Black River Bank v.
Page, 800.
TAXATION. See CHARITABLE USE, 1; CONSTITUTIONtAL LAw, 4; INJUxc-
TOte, 5; M UNICIPAL CORPORATION, 4.
1. If a tax is imposed upon a county or other limited portion of a state it
must be not only for a purpose public as regards that county but also local ;
and by local is meant that it must give the county such special and peculiar
benefits as amount to compensation for the slecial burden laid upon it. Gar-
rard Co. Court v. Navigation Co., 151.
2. The improvement of a navigable river cannot be considered (at least
under the circumstances of this case) as such a local benefit to the people of
the counties bordering on it. Id.
3. The distinction between navigable rivers and other highways for pur-
poses of local taxation, discussed by HARDIN, J. Id.
4. Even if it be conceded that the legislature may lease a public improve-
ment (as e. g. the navigation of the Kentucky river) to a private corporation
and authorize the adjoining counties to subscribe and tax the people to pay
for stock in such corporation, yet it cannot authorize the imposition of a tax
on such counties to pay even in part the rent reserved from such corporation
to the state. I'd.
5. Where a statute has in view a single object, and one of the means pre-
scribed, and .without which the object cannot be accomplished, is void as
beyond the power of the legislature, the whole statute must fail. Id.
6. Statutes authorizing the redemption of laud sold for taxes are to be con-
strued favorably to the owners. Corbutt v. Nutt, 206.
7. A person "havipig charge" of land within the meaning of the Act of
June 7th 1862 is not obliged to take the oath required by the Act of March
3d 1865. Id.
8. TAXATION OF INTER-STATE TRAVEL, 418.
9. The interest of the General Government in the Union Pacific Railroad
Company, though chartered and aided by Congress, is not such as to exempt
the company and its property from taxation by a state through which the
road is located and operated. Union Pacific Railroad v. Lincoln Co., 458.
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10. The doctrine of the implied exemption of Federal instrumentalities
from state taxation considered, and applied to this corporation, and the result
reached that it is not such an instrumentality, and if, in any case, it is such,
that the paramount rights of the government would not be affected, and,
under the Acts of Congress, could not be injured by any subordinate right of'
the state to tax and sell the property of the corporation. Union Pacific Rail-
road v. Lincoln Co., 458.
11. Under the legislation of Nebraska, the county of Lincoln has the right
to tax railroads in the adjoining territory attached to it for revenue purposes.
.d.
12. The bonds of a corporation in Missouri belonging to a non-resident
intestate, when held by an administrator in the state are subject to taxation.
State, 6'c., Lee's Adm'x v. St. Louis Co., 606.
13. A tax paid under an order of a county judge requiring the same to be
paid with costs and an execution directed to issue therefor, is not in a legal
sense a voluntary payment. Bailey v. Buell et al., 606.
14. If the assessment is illegal a tax may be recovered from the assessors.
Id.
15. Assessors are liable in an action, for an erroneous assessment of a
person, not an inhabitant of the town. Id.
16. Chapter 124 of the laws of 1869 of Kansas providing for the assess-
ment of railroad property is neither unconstitutional nor void. Missouri R.
Railroad v. Morris, Treas., 607.
17. Irregularities in the assessment will not render the tax void. Id.
18. A court of equity will not set aside the tax nor grant an injunction to
restrain its collection. Id.
19. A sale for taxes for a year for which the taxes were paid is invalid.
Raynor v. Lee, 607.
20. The collector is not personally liable for taxes erroneously assessed
and levied. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. v. Charles, 750.
TELEGRAPH. See WITNEsS, 1.
1. Telegraph companies may make reasonable regulations concerning the
transmission of messages, but cannot avoid liability for their own want of
care or skill in the performance of what they undertake to do. Graham v.
Union Tdegraph Co., 319.
2. A regulation that messages must be repeated by being sent back from
the station to which they are addressed is reasonable ; but where the action is
not for incorrect transmission of the message, but for failure to deliver it at
all, the non-compliance by the plaintiff with such regulation is no defence. Id.
3. In an action against a telegraph company for failure to deliver a mes-
sage to "ship oil as soon as possible," the plaintiff cannot recover for profits
he might have made had the message been promptly delivered. Such profits
cannot be considered as fairly within the contemplation of the parties, and
are too speculative and contingent in their nature to be a proper element in
the measure of damages. .1d.
4. A telegraph company will be liable for delay in transmitting a message.
Rittenhouse v. Independent Telegraph Co., 800.
TENANT IN COMMON. See EVIDENCE, 18; FARTITION, 4.
1. One tenant in common cannot bring ejectment against his co-tenant
unless there has been ha ouster. Hammond v. Morrison's Lessee, 478.
2. The possession of one, of several owners of land, though under a deed
purporting to convey the entire interest, will not be presumed as hostile to
the other owners. King v. Whaleg, 543.
TENANT FOR LIFE.
Is bound to keep the premises in as good repair as when he entered. In
re Sale of Infants' Lands, 278.
TENDER.
Is a good plea in bar, and if followed up protects the defendant. Wteeler
v. Woodward, 800.
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TIME.
1. The general rule in the computation of time within which an act is to
be done is to exclude the first day and include the last. Citizens' Bank v.
Ober, 36.
2. This is the rule prescribed by the Bankrupt Act, unless the last day
happens to fall on Sunday, in which case that day is excluded also. In all
other cases Sundays are counted as other days. Id.
TITLE. See EXEcuTIox, 4; LIMITATIONS, 12 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 12,
18.
1. A party who has conveyed land by deed of warranty may acquire a
subsequent title by disseisin. Traip v. Traip, 71.
2. The title of the United States to personal property is subject to be con-
tested by a citizen who has a claim to the property. Dawson v. Susong, 207.
3. The brand of the United States on stock, and a sale of it at public sale,
will not preclude the true owner. Id.
4. THE PROPRIETARy TITLE OF THE PENNs, 487.
5. A person having no title to a tract of land cannot question one of the
conveyances in the claim of title thereto. Carithers v. Waearer, 607.
6. Nor one simply holding a tax title. Id.
7. A lessee of land contracting to pay all tales, cannot acquire a valid
tax title during such lease to the land. Id.
8. A tax deed conveying such title is void. Id.
9. A purchaser at a sheriff's sale knowing a third party is in possession,
is put on inquiry as to the title. Afaupin v. Emmons, 750.
10. An unrecorded deed is good between the parties and persons with
notice thereof. Id.
TRADE-MARK.
1. One tradesman has no right to use the trade-marks of another. Sone-
broker v. Stonebraker, 543.
2. Trade-marks are property. Id.
3. The use of trade-marks without the consent of the owner, will be re-
strained by injunction. Id.
4. A trade-mark is not different in principle from the marks or brands
owners of live-stock, which run at large, put upon them. The object is the
same, and that is, to distinguish the property bearing it from that of another.
Candee v. Deere, 694.
5. A proprietor can have but one trade-mark, and it must be in some
manner attached to the article manufactured. Id.
6. It must have a practical existence, not resting in the mind of the owner,
but stamped or impressed or attached in some way to the article itself. Id.
7. It is the actual use of the trade-mark affixed to the merchandise of the
manufacturer, and this alone, which can impart to it the elements of property.
Id.
8. The mere declaration of a person, however long, and however exten-
sively published, that he claims property in a word as his trade-mark, cannot
even tend to make it his property. Id.
9. The law is well settled, that a circular, price-list, or advertisement, no
matter how frequently repeated, cannot constitute a trade-mark. Id.
10. When words have acquired a generic meaning, one manufacturer has
the same right to use them that another manufacturer has. Id.
11. There can be no property in letters and numbers, or a combination of
letters and numbers, where they are used to denote the various sizes and
qualities and patterns of the article manufactured. Id.
12. Monopolies are odious, and a manufacturer cannot acquire property in
the name of a town so as to prevent another manufacturer from doing the
same business in the same town and from advertising the fact, so as to let the
world know it. Id.
TRESPASS. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 16.
The extortion of a confession of larceny by threatening one with hanging
constitutes an aggravated trespass, and renders the party liable in damages.
Stallings v. Owens, 133.
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TROVER. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 7; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 13.
1. Where the plaintifrs sheep having broken out of his lot mingled with
the defendant's on the highway, and were driven to defendant's yard and then
separated, it does not amount to an unlawful taking or to conversion. Van
Valk-enburgh v. Tuaytr, 72.
2. Will lie against the wife of the purchaser of land, to whom the deed
has been made, For certain plants reserved by the vendor by a written agree-
ment, on refusal to deliver them. Riny v. l3ilings, 135.
3. Cannot be maintained against a bank for hnds deposited therein, which
have been lost or stolen. Deurbourn v. Union .\ational Bunk, 608.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See ExLCVTOR AND AD3dtNISTRATOR, 8; LimT.A-
TIONS, 7; VENDOR AND rLURCHASER, 1.
i. Releases from cestuis que trust without a settlement of the trust account
are looked upon by the law with jealousy, lut fraud must be shown to set
them aside. .Shartel's Appeal, 352.
2. It is an established rule in equity that where one accepts the confidence
or trust reposed in him by another, he will be converted into a trustee to pro-
tect the interests of the party confiding. Foote v. Foote, 352.
3. Implied and resulting trusts are excepted from the statute relative to
uses and trusts. Id.
4. A party taking a conveyance of property in good faith to hold for
another in trust, will be protected by equity against persons claiming that he
holds as true and lawful owner. Id.
5. The section of the statute relative to fraudulent conveyances which
requires trusts to he in writing has no application to such a case. Id.
6. A trustee making a sale cannot become the purchaser either directly or
through the aid of another. Terwilligrr v. Brown, 479.
USURY. See MORTGAGE, 20.
1. Under the Interest Law of Illinois of 1857, a note bearing 12 per cent.
interest per annum is usurious. Humill v. Mason, 134.
2. The statute may be given in evidence under the general issue. Id.
3. The law in force at the time the remedy is sought upon a contract
governs as to questions of usury. Perrin v. Lyiman's Adm'x, 188.
4. The provision of the Interest Law of 1867 (Acts 1867, p. 151), that
"all interest exceeding tile rate of ten per centum per annum shall be deemed
usurious and illegal, as to the excess only, and in any action upon a contract-
affected by such usury, such excess may be recouped by the defendant, when-
ever it has been reserved or paid beforc the bringing of the suit," embraces
contracts made before, as well as those made after, the passage of said act.
Id.
5. In an action ott a note where the sole question is as to whether it was
usurious, the question is one of fact entirely, and the finding of the jury is
conclusive. Horton v. Moot, 750.
VENDOR AND PURCILASER. See DEED, 2, 4, 5 ; FAuD, 5; STATUTE OF
IRAUDS, 2; PRACTICE, 11; STOCK.
I. Of Real Estale.
I. If the purchaser ut a sale under a deed of tru-t pays his money and
takes a deed before lie hia notice, either in fwtet or cotstructively by legal
record, of a plior deed, his title is protecrtd. even though his vendurs, the
trustee and beneficiary, had notice in filet of' the pritr deed. Hlaqton V.
Stevens, 107.
2. A deed of trust recited that it was made to secqre a prni~sory note due
the beneficiary, whereas in fact it was made to indenity hint as surety on a
note to a third person. ield, that the anunt of the dchr being correctly
described, and the transaction being without fraud, there was no such misde-
scription as should affect the validity of the deed. Id.
3. Where the vendor of land reserved the right to remove certain plants,
by a written agreement, the conveyance of the legal title which was in another
party, to the wite ,': tihe Iaurchacr wiflth-t mentioning the reservation, does
not defeat the ven 'ar: ri,_-lit. Ring v. Billings, 134.
4. The vendor's lin flor unpaid purechu-e-noucy ik exzinguiehed, by receiv-
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ing a note with security from the purchaser, and delivering a deed. Carrico
v. 7h Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 414.5. Where land sold by parol is afterwards conveyed, no one can gainsay
it. Saccett v. Spencer, 533.
6. A, purchaser for value, though his deed is not recorded will not be post-
poned to creditors under a voluntary assignment. Spackman v. Ott, 534.
7. Where a contract for the sale of real estate, contains a stipulation that
non-compliance with its terms shall work a forfeiture, upon certain condi-
tions to be observed by the vendor, such conditions must be strictly observed
by the vendor. Case v. Wolcott, 670.
8. The measure of damages in an action by vendee against vendor for
breach of contract to convey real estate, where vendee has made improve-
ments, is the difference between the unpaid purchase-money and the value of
the lands at the time of breach. Id.
9. Where the vendor fails to deliver possession, having received the pur-
chase-money according to his agreement, he is liable either to return the money
or deliver possession. Hoag v. Owen, 751.
II. Of Personal Property.
10. Where the vendor of personal property makes fraudulent representa-
tions in regard to its value, or is othewise guilty of fraud in making or per-
forming the contract, the vendee has his election of remedies for the injury ;
he may stand to the bargain even after he has discovered the fraud, and reco-
ver damages on account of it, or he may rescind the contract and recover
back what he has paid. Heastings v. Mc Gee, 338.
11. If he elects the former remedy and sues in case for the deceit, he is
not bound to return or make tender of the property. Id.
12. The title to property is not changed where the vendee is in possession
under a void contract of sale. Fullerton v. Dalton, 414.
13. The use of such property by vendee after demand by vendor, is a con-
version. id.
14. Where there is a contract to purchase at a future time no title passes.
Reitz's Appeal 414.
15. Where property is sold with a stipulation for repurchase at same price
within a year, the vendor is not bound to take it, if it does not exist in the
form it was. Id.
16. Where the subject of a sale is not reasonably capable of an actual de-
livery, as in the case of the furniture of a large hotel, a constructive delivery
will be sufficient. McKibbin v. Martin, 406.
17. The possession of the chattels by the vendee must be exclusive of the
vendor. Id.
18. On a sale of machinery to be fixed to realty, part of the price in cash
and part to be secured by a chattel mortgage, the title will pass on the day of
sale, though delivery of mortgage is delayed. Matter of Hicks, 477.
19. Notice of the defective quality of goods purchased by sample must be
given at once to the vendor, in order to make him liable to furnish others.
Woodward v. Libby, 600.
20. Where full opportunity is afforded to a purchaser for examining pro-
perty, and the quantity depends on the payment, he cannot after sale claim a
deduction from the price on the ground of misrepresentation as to quantity.
Pattison v. Jenkins, 669.
21. Right of stoppage in transitu is not lost to the vendor of chattels on
the insolvency of the vendee, where the chattels are sold by such vendee to
another before they arrive, though such other party thought they had, and
was ignorant of the original vendor having any interest. Pattison v. Culton,
748.
22. Where the purchase of property is with a fraudulent intent, the de-
livery will give no title sufficient to protect it from the claim of the vendor,
as against an assignee of the vendee, even if mixed with other property of
the vendee. J7oslin v. Cowee, 751.
23. Only innocent purchasers who purchase property converted into a dif-
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ferent species are protected, and not they, if they take title from a wrong-
doer. Joslin v. Cowee, 751.
24. The owner of the original material may still retake it in its improved
state. Id.
25. The vendor has three remedies on failure of purchaser to perform his
contract, to hold the property for him and recover the entire purchase-money,
to sell it after notice and recover the difference, or to retain it as his own
anl recover the difference between contract price and the market price at
time and place of delivery. Dustan v. McAndrew, 800.
VERDICT.
When the special finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict
the former controls, and judgment may be rendered accordingly. Nichols v.
eaer, 414."
VOTE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
WAGES. See SHrING, I.
WAR.
1. The legality of a capture of private property in time of war is not to
be presumed, it must be proved. Branner v. Felkner, 201.
2. A private soldier cannot make a capture of property in the hands of a
citizen in time of war. Id.
WARRANTY. See AGREEMENT, 1.
Where a covenant against encumbrances is broken in the lifetime of the
coveanntee, the administrator and not the heir mu-t sue for the damages.
Friuk v. Bellis, 671.
WATER AND WATERCOURSES.
Where a stream during a flood make. a new channel, the owner af the land
has .a right to build a barrier across such channel and restore it to its old
course. Pierce v. Kinney, 479.
WAY. See STREET.
WHARF. See RIPARIAX OWNEE, 7, 9.
WILL. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 19; EXECUTOR AND ADINISTRATOR, 11;
SPEeCFIC PERnFORMANCE, 1; WITNESS, 1. 2.
1. Where a testator in unambiguous language devised a lot in section 32
of the town of Joliet, parol evidence is not admissille to show that he meant
a lot in section 31. Kurt6 v. Ilibaer, 93.
2. For the purpose of determining the object of testator's bounty or the
subject of disposition, parol evidence may be received ; but in this case the
devise was certain both as to object and subject, and the court could not look
beyond the instrument itself. Id.
3. In a bill for a partition of land devised by a father, parol testimony is
admissible to how that one of the parties (a daughter) has been in possession
of part of the land, and has made valuable improvements under a promise by
testator to convey. Such evidence is not to affect the will, but the rights of
parties under it, and the daughter i, entitled to have the part improved 1 her
set out in her purpart, or to be allowed for her improvements if partition
cannot'be thus made. Id.
4. Proof that testator was of disposing mind and memory, anterior to the
time of making will, is not suflicent to establish the will. HIolloway v. Gal-
loway, 135.
5. The attesting witnesses need not he present at the signing of a will, if
the testator acknowledges it as his will, and requests them to sign. A.
6. The rule in Shelly's Case must govern in the cmnstruction of wills made
prior to June 13th 1820 in Massachusetts. Quck's Ex. v. Quick, 207.
7. A devise to such heirs of a tenant flir litb, "us the law directs" in case
of dying intestate, means as the law was at thme time of nmking tile will. Il.
8. Where two persons agreed to iakc mnutual will., lut b mistake each
signed the will of the other, and one ,lied tII, ,hat lie died intestate.
Alter's Appeal, 242.
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9. There being no will to reform, the legislature could not give a court
power to establish it upon proof of the intent of the parties; such an act would
.be the divesting of a vested estate. Alter's Appeal, 242.
10. A power of sale will not be implied in a will because it is necessary or
convenient to the execution of the directions in the will. Seeqer's Ex'rs Y.
Seeger, 280.
11. Where there are express directions to sell and no person named, the
power is held to be in the executor by implication. Id.
12. PARoL TESTIMONT IN THE CONSTnuCTION OF WILLS, 353.
13. A limitation to a widow during her widowhood is valid and effective.
Clark v. Tennison, 415.
14. That no provision is made for the time between tie marriage of the
widow and her death, will not create an intestacy, the next devisees will take
if children. Id.
15. By way. of executory bequest personal property may be limited over
after the determination of a life interest, in like manner and to the same
extent as real estate. lfilliantson v. Hall, 465.
16. A. by his will directed that his wife should "1 hold and have the use
of all my property, both real and personal, during. her natural life, to raise
and school my children with, and at her decease an equal division to be made
between my children ; that is to say, * * * my daughters shall have the
movable property, to be divided between them." Held, 1. That the will
created an express trust of the personal as well as real property, for the maili-
tenance and education of the children. 2. That the title to the personal
estate was in the widow for life, with remainder to the daughters. Id.
17. The widow having converted the personalty,'and invested the pro-
ceeds in real estate in her own name in fee simple, it was held that in equity
it must be treated as if she had taken the title to herself for life, with remain-
der to the daughters. Id.
18. A devise over which never can take effect leaves the estate in first taker.
Smiley v. Bailey, 534.
19. When a testatrix upon making certain specific bequests, gave the re-
mainder of her estate to her heirs at law, held, that notwithstanding the
executor had sold the land devised and converted it into money, the surplus
remaining after the payment of debts and legacies should, for the purpose of
distribution, be treated as land, and go to the heirs, and not the next of kin
to the testatrix. Held, also, that the remainder should be disposed of pre-
cisely as if no will had been made. Richards v. Miller, 727.
20. The word "heir" in a will, when used in connection with real estate,
is to be strictly construed, unless it clearly appears from the instrument that
a different meaning was intended. The heirs of a person are those upon
whom the estate vests by operation of law, and the husband, in respect to the
real estate of his wife dying without children, is included in that description,
and the fact that she gives him a pecuniary legacy does not necessarily
exclude his right of heirship in any remainder undisposed of by the will. Id.
WITNESS. See WILL, 5.
1. Upon a caveat to a will, the executor, not a party to the proceedings in
the capacity of executor, is competent to testify upon his own offer, and in
his own behalf, as caveatee. Schull v. 1Murra, 128.
2. Under the Act of 1867 of Illinois, the devises under a will who were
defendants in a suit, are only competent witnesses of facts occurring after the
testator's death. Holloway v. Galloway, 136.
3. A distributee who releases to an administrator all his right to what may
be recovered in a suit brought by the administrator, is a competent witness.
Forrester v. Torrence, 352.
4. A witness divesting himself of a mere collateral interest in the suit, is
not within the rule in Post v. Avery, 5 W. & S. 509 [Penna. Rep.]. Id.
WITNESS.
1. Telegraphic communications are not privileged, and a telegraphic
operator is bound to testify to the contents of a message, if it be material
and relevant. The State v. Litchfield, 376.
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2. A jury may convict on the unsupported testimony of an accomplice.
Te State v. Litchfield, 376.
3. There is no rule of law excluding the testimony of a witness who admits
that he Perjured himself on a former trial. Fisher v. The People, 480.
4. "Where a witness was introduced as an expert in judging of the genuine-
nes of signatures, it was held to be proper for the party calling him to
iuquire of him as to his residence, his occupation, and the length of time he
had been engaged in business that would qualify him to judge of signatures,
and also to his actual experience in such matters as a witness in court.
Tyler v. Todd, 627.
5. Upon the question whether a signature is genuine or forged it is the
practice in this state to allow the disputed signature to be compared in court
with others that are genuine. Id.
6. But for this purpose they must not only be genuine, but must be admitted
or proved to be such before they'can be used, and a signature of which the
genuineness is not thus estallishod cannot be used even in a cross-examina-
tion of a witness to test his accuracy as to another signature. d.
7. An expert ought not to be permitted to give an opinion as to the genuine-
,e.-s of a signature upon a comparison of signatures not before the court. Id.
8. Where an expert testified as to his opinion from a comparison of signa-
tures made out of court, it was held that the opposing party had a right to
olticez to the evidence, but, not taking that objection, had no right to require
the production of the signatures so examined. Id.
9. A witness cannot be inquired of in cross-examination as to irrelevant
matters, for the purpose of contradicting him. Id.
to. It is not the nature of the punishment but of the ofrepce which deter-
wines its infamous character so as to disqualify a witness convicted of it, and
enbezziement is not in 3'ennsylvania such a crime. Schuitylkill Co. v. Copley,
783.
END OF VOL. XIX.

